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FOREWORD 
The purpose of the present document ia to provide general references 
about Perû, its history and its main development issues and problems. 
Part One is a very schematic historical review that might help to 
understand better current circumstances and future prospects. 
Part Two summarizes the main aspects of each one of the 13 development 
issues and problems identified in Part Two of the document "IDRC 
Activities in Perû". Due to constraints imposed by available time and 
information, not ail of these issues are analysed with the same detail. 
However, the intention is to provide general notions of the research 
problems that will be discussed in the Perù meeting. Several sources have 
been consuited, including officiai documents, international organizations' 
reports, journais, periodicals, books, and IDRC documents and project 
summaries. 
The document is for internai circulation only. 
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PnIR T ®MIE 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
It has been said that Perû has an impossible geography. The third largest 
country in South America, only a very small percentage of its land area is 
usable for agricultural purposes (estimates range between 8% and 15%). 
Traditionaliy, the country descriptions divide it into three main natural 
regions. A narrow coastal strip, mostly desertic and crossed by 36 
seasonai rivers, that only accounts for 11 per cent of the national 
territory but is inhabited roughly by half of the total population. The 
coastai valleys are fertile but require irrigation to produce cotton, race or 
sugar, the three main regional crops. The Andes, covering more than a 
quarter of the country, run North to South divided in three mountain 
ranges. High peaks (the highest being the 22,205 ft. Huascaràn) and deep 
ravines constitute a formidable barrier between the coast and the Amazon 
region and creating a disadvantageous hydrological division by which 
barely a hundred miles from the Pacific Ocean ail the important rivers 
become part of the Atiantic-flowing Amazon system. The land here is 
poor for agriculture but has the richest minerai deposits. Its population 
now reaches about 30% of the total. The Eastern slopes of the Andes lead 
to vast tropical forests and the Amazon region, which account for slightly 
less than two-thlrds of the Peruvian territory and are inhabited by only 
1 1 % of the total population. Most of the arable land in this area is located 
in the Eastern foothiils of the Andes (called the "jungle eyebrow"). 
In spite of its beautiful and varied landscape, the country's dramatic and 
difficult topography has posed enormous obstacles to development. 
Natural disasters are frequent and sometimes- devastating, 
communications and transportation difficult and costly, national 
integration slow and painful. But nature cannot be biamed entirely for 
Perù's current woes. History has taken a large toli and has a significant 
weight on a country with such a long and intense cultural past. In Tact, 
ancient Peruvians were extremely creative in accomodating to such an 
environment developing a culture adapted to its demands and threats, and 
taking advantage of its huge potential benefits. 
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Indigenous cultural development, conquest and.colony 
When the Spanish conquistadores landed in Perù in 1532, the territory 
already had a human history dating back 20 thousand years, of which the 
Inca empire represented only a very short and recent development. For 
thousands of years its inhabitants patiently developed agricultural 
practices, bred plants and domesticated animals suitable to the different 
climates and soif composition. Archæological findings reveal not only 
advanced techniques in pottery, textiles and architecture but also a most 
sophisticated social and economic order. Indeed, one of the most 
impressive achievements of ancient Perû's ethnic groups is the economic 
and socio-political system denominated "the vertical control of a variety 
of ecological floors", designed to take advantage of the various and close 
micro-climates created by the differences of altitude in the Andes. Ethnic 
groups held plots of land at differing altitudes, growing maize, potatoes, 
quinoa, tarwi, and other indigenous grains, as well as coca leaves and hot 
peppers in the Eastern Andean foothilis. Flocks of llamas and alpacas 
grazed in the high level pastures, producing wool and meat and acting as 
beasts of burden. The sea was also a part of the whole production order in 
some cases, providing fish, seafood, sait and a valuable ritual object: 
seashells. 
During the fifteenth century the incas rapidly conquered a territory 
covering the length of the Andes and the Pacific coast from what Is 
currently Northern Ecuador to Central Chile, but recent discoveries reveal 
they had also a strong presence in vast jungle areas. The Incas developed a 
large army and military skills that helped them to achieve their 
expansionist objectives subduing other groups through negotiation or war. 
The Incas were also extremely skillful in developing an efficient State 
bureaucracy, in charge of organizing, controlling and distributing 
production. Its basic communal and productive unit was the ayllu . 
Several ayllu were grouped together under local chief tains (kuracas) who 
held larger landholdings of their own. Although they were authoritarian 
rulers, the Incas never took physical surplus from the,ayllus but only 
labour force to work the lands of the Inca and for the construction and 
maintenance of an impressive infrastructure of roads, agricultural 
terraces, irrigation systems and military fortresses. In spite of sharp 
discrepancies among historians about the "nature" of this society, there is 
broad consensus that the Incas managed to ensure basic material 
necessities for a rather large population (estimates vary substantially but 
It was certainly of more than ten million for the whole empire), an 
achievement never since equalled in Peruvian history. 
The ?,rish invasion altered this organized world and destroyed most of 
its b i ic features. Mining for export to Spain became the central activity 
around which the whole colonial economy orbited. Peruvian gold and silver 
were used to finance European wars and ended in the hands of merchants 
and bankers in The Netheriands, the Italian peninsula, France and Great 
Britain. It is estimated that up to two thirds of European commercial and 
industrial development was financed with precious metals from the 
Spanish South American colonies. Agriculture occupied a subordinated 
function in the colonial order, catering for the miners and the population 
of the urban settlements that flourished near the mines. 
The arrivai of the Spanlards also meant a demographic catastrophe, due to 
new diseases to which the natives had no resistance. The total population 
reduced to around two million by the turn of the seventeenth century, and a 
historian contends that the people suffered no less than seventeen 
epidemics between 1520 and 1600. The importation of slaves from Africa 
was used by the Spaniards to increase the supply of labour for the coastal 
plantations, since the indian population was wiped out by disease in many 
coastal valleys, or simply fled to the highlands. Indian labour was 
confined to the mines, small textile mills (called obrajes ), and 
agriculture in the highlands estates, where production was organized along 
more feudal lines, with Indians receiving plots of land in return for their 
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Another dramatic consequence of Spanish rule was the foundation of Lima 
on a coastal site. For milleniums the Andes had exercised, a dominant 
political and cultural position over the territory in economic terms. 
Shifting the centre of power from Cusco to Lima had a decisive effect on 
the future development of Perû. It meant turning the back to the Andes, and 
vesting economic and cultural interest to Europe. Thus, while Lima 
enjoyed the monopolistic privilege of handiing the entire trade between 
Spain and Its South American dominions, Cusc-o and other Andean cities and 
towns decayed and followed the life cycles of regional production for 
exports. 
Administrative convenience led Viceroy Toledo in the 1560's to group aylk 
into reservations, the colonial ancestor of the current "peasant 
communities". The viceroy made the kuracas responsible for the levying 
of Crown taxes and the provision of labour force for the mines and 
agriculture. In addition, the Indians had to buy goods imported from Spain 
at the prices fixed by local royal officials. 
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Economically exploited, politically dominated and culturally isolated in a 
society divided along ethnic lines, the natives periodically rebelled 
against their immediate Spanish rulers, though never against the Crown. 
Their protests were sometimes passive and non violent, like in the case of 
the Taki Onaov (known as the "malady of singing"), a movement that began 
shortly after the Spanish invasion, in 1565, in Ayacucho (curlously enough 
the geographical origin of "Shining Path"), where the ecological damage 
caused by the Spaniards was particularly severe (Andean camelids were 
almost extinguished and natives were being used to transport products, 
pigs and sheep destroyed the maize fields, etc.) and added to the already 
devastating effects of diseases, plunder and poor labour conditions. The 
Indian preachers of the movement induced their fellows to religious 
disobedience and to follow a new religion, mixture of ancient rites and 
catholic rituals, but opposed no resistance when the movement was 
violently repressed. However, others took a more active and aggressive 
form of rebellion, like Juan Santos Atawallpa whose uprising's influence 
lasted for more than twenty years and covered a vast zone of the Eastern 
Andes. 
Generally speaking, the colonial period has been considered a dark era of 
Peruvian history with very negative connotations. This is partly due to the 
so-calied "black legend" concocted by the British to discredit the Spanish 
Crown and present themselves as a civilized force capable of unleashing 
the forces of development through free trade. It is true that Spanish 
domination interrupted an autonomous development process that had been 
taking place for thousands of years, and that greed and abuse were driving 
forces of the newcomers who sought to drain natural resources and exploit 
the natives. However, the synchretism that resulted from the culture they 
brought and that of,the native population is a unique and undeniable 
historical fact that, whether one litres it or not, has to be accepted and 
positively streamlined. The Perù of nowadays is neither Hispanic nor 
purely Indian, including the must aristocratic urban districts or the 
remotest highlands. The problem lies precisely in accepting that reality 
and in purging the negative aspects of this cultural 'collision", such as 
racism, rejection of vernacular language, mores and values, while at the 
same time emphasizing the enormous potential of this rich cultural 
diversity. Accepting a mixed cultural heritage implies, therefore, building 
a new culture that recognizes its roots, but is totally different from the 
ones that originated it. This has remained until the present the great 
cultural challenge of national integration that will eventually determine 
whether Pert is a viable nation-state. 
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By the eighteenth century, Perû had lost importance for the Spanish Crown. 
The depletion of the Potosi and Huancavelica mines producing silver and 
mercury, respectively, had diminished its relevance, while Venezuela and 
the River Plate's agricultural production became progressively important. 
The economic and political power of Lima was further weakened by the 
contraband of British, Dutch and French goods that undermined the 
monopolistic privileges of the capital, as well as by the sweeping reforms 
introduced by the Spanish Bourbon king Charles III, who finaily decreed 
free trade between America and Europe and created separate autonomous 
administrative units, reducing Lima's control on vast territories of 
Spanish South America. 
It is in this critical context that the largest and most influential of the 
Indian rebellions against the Spaniards spread through most of Southern 
Perû. Lead by a Cusco kuraca, named José Gabriel Condorcanqui, who took 
the narre of Tûpac Amaru H, the rebellion took place in 1780 and its aim 
was to reduce the abuses of colonial rulers. Initially supported by 
provincial criollos, the movement was rapidly joined by Indian peasants 
and the insurgents' aims became the establishment of an Indian and 
mestizo republic. Between November 1780 and March 1781, thousands of 
rebels were killed and Tûpac Amaru was eventually excuted in the main 
square of Cusco, along with his wife and other relatives. Many members of 
the Indian élite were killed or deported, their privileges abolished and the 
use of quechua banned. This was probably the last opportunity for an 
independence movement involving both criollos and Indians. 
indenendence and republic 
Peruvian independence was largely the resuit of pressure and active 
intervention by external forces. The merchant classes of the River Plate 
basin and Venezuela were realizing the potential benefits of severing the 
ties with Spain to fully integrate the international free market. However, 
the Argentinian José de San Martin and the Venezuelan Simôn Bolivar 
quickly realized that as long as Perû remained in the hands of the Crown, 
their independent territories would be at bay. 
In 1820, after expelling the Royal army from Chile, San Martin and its 
companion, the British freelance naval commander Lord Cochrane, arrived 
at Paracas, on the Peruvian coast, with an army of around four thousand 
men. San Martin procclaimed Perû's independence on 28 July 1821, while 
Royal troops were stili holding positions in the Central Andes. He then 
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met Bolivar in Ecuador to discuss the political future of Perû. San Martin 
supported the idea of imposing a European-style constitutional monarchy, 
while Bolivar allegedly wanted a more liberal democratic order, which at 
the end turned out to be his own personal will as dictator, San Martin 
quietly retired to Boulogne-sur-Mer and Bolivar's troops defeated the 
royalist forces at the batties of Ayacucho and Junin, under the command of 
the Venezuelan Antonio José de Sucre, in 1824. 
Perù payed a high price for this imposed independence. The first thirty 
years of the new republic were afflicted by stagnation and continuous 
political strife. With exhausted mines and in a disadvantageous 
geographical position to trade with Europe, Peruvian exports halved 
between the 1780's and the 1820's, while internat production declined. 
For decades, local warlords, called caudillos, fought each other for power. 
Between 1826 and 1865, Perû suffered thirty-four presidents, 
twenty-seven of which were active military officers. 
Not only did the social and economic conditions of the Indians not improve 
but actually worsened. In fact, one of the first measures Bolivar took was 
to reinstate the taxes on Indian peasants previously abolished by San 
Martin. His also apparently democratic decree of 1824, granting property 
rights to individual peasants over formerly communal plots, reversed San 
Martin's decree forbidding the Indian forced labour system because il: 
enabled to acquire large estates, thus extending the 
system and incorporating Indians as serfs. 
From the very beginning of independence, the British sought to control 
Peruvian trade to the distress of the United States that even tried to 
postpone South American independence movements. British influence was 
only countervailed by the French, but between they both had such an 
economic power, that the Peruvian government invited them to draft the 
trade laws for the country in the 1830's. Gold, silver, quinine, as well as 
sheep and alpaca wool were the main commodities exported by British 
houses. Wool trade was so important and profitable at the time that it 
awoke separatist ambitions in Southern Perù and gave origin to a 
short-lived Perù-Bolivia Confederation. 
The Guano Boom and the Pacific War 
The basic pattern of political instability, subordination of national 
economy to international economic cycles, and strong foreign presence in 
the country's most profitable productive sectors and activities was never 
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to actually recede. The so-called guano boom and the subsequent war 
with Chile is an illustrative period in this respect. In the rnidst of a 
severe economic crisis, Perû's economy was suddenly activated by the 
appearance of a profitable export trade: the guano (dung) of the millions 
of seabirds that had covered off-shore islands with this exceptional 
fertilizer. The qualities of the guano to improve agricultural yields was 
known since pre-inca times and, according to an Spanish cron/sta , its use 
was learnt by the Europeans from the natives. The development of 
capital-intensive agriculture in mid-nineteenth century Europe, reveals 
Chat they took Avantage of this transfer of technology and developed a 
huge export market for the product. 
To exploit the guano deposits, the Peruvian government established a 
State rnonopoly, following the traditions of the Spanish Crown, and then 
sub-contracted the tracte to British merchant houses. The guano was 
extracted rnainly by Chinese labourers irnported from Macao. In a few 
years, trie Peruvian economy was the most dynamic and promising in Latin 
Arnerica even though the benefits of the tracte were circumscribed to a 
reduced é/tee. Between 1840 and 1880, the Peruvian State received an 
average of sixty % of the net profits of such exports. However, as it 
usually happens with rnisrnanaged economic booms, when the guano era 
was over, trie Peruvian finances were left in very bad shape. Most of the 
revenues were spent in enlarging the bureaucracy and the army, and in 
serving an ever increasing externat debt. Significantly enough, one of the 
first official acts of the country's first republican government was 
precisely to contract foreign credits worth 1.8 million sterling pounds, 
that by 1848 totalled 4.5 million. This forced President Ramôn Castilla, 
one of the few presidents with vision and genuine interest in the country's, 
development during the nineteenth century, to dedicate half of the State's 
income to pay the outstanding foreign debt. 
The historical guano era is a complex period full of hopes, deep 
frustration and failed attempts to push the country forward. President 
Castilla tried to develop a "national bourgoisie" using the money to pay 
inter-rial public debts dating back to the days of the independence war. 
Corruption lead to the payment of rnany fraudulent claims that facilitated 
a huge transfer of capital frorn the state to the criollos on the basis of 
new forelgn credit. Worst of ail, this transfer only served for the 
upsurging of a predominantly commercial bourgeoisie, based on the coast, 
that pressed for the control of the guano trade. 
Another important national project linked to the latter years of the guano 
boom was the construction of railroads. The main cause for a fourfold 
increase in Perû's externat debt between 1868 and 1872, when it stood at 
35 million sterling pounds, and for the death of hundreds of Chinese and 
Indian labourera, the railways linked production centres with seaports and 
did little to integrate the country's internat regional markets. Allegedly 
the rnost expensive railroad in the world, mainly due to the corrupt 
practices that pervaded its financial management, the venture made Perû 
the largest debtor in the London rnoney market. In 1870 the government 
granted in despair a rnonopoly on guano to the French merchant house of 
Auguste Dreyfus, linked to the Paris bank "Boeieté Generale". Dreyfus 
assumed the foreign debt and facilitated an advance to the government. 
According to the own words of the '5ocieté s director, this was 
"the largest, most positive and most profitable business agreement in the 
world". 
The sad epilogue to the guano extravaganza was the war between Perû and 
Chile. By the late-1870's the boom was coming to an end. Nitrates and 
synthetic fertilizers were being developed as cheaper alternatives. 
President Manuel Pardo nationalised the nitrate deposits of the 
southernrnost department of Tarapacà, which like those of Bolivia were 
being exploited by British and Chilean entrepreneurs. When the Bolivian 
Congress imposed taxes on nitrate exports, the Chileans, supported by the 
British, declared war on that country thus forcing Perù to enter the 
conflict in virtue of a mutual defence treaty. The results were disastrous 
for Perû. It exposed the ineptitude and corruption of its ruling class, the 
poor identification of the population with Perù as a nation-state and the 
lack of preparedness for a national emergency. Isolated acts of naval, 
military, and civil heroism did not prevent the Chileans from achieving 
their objective of destroying the country's productive base to avoid 
retaliation. Lima was sacked, the National Library burnt, the hac/ ooa. 
ruined and part of the territory, including Lima, occupied. 
One of the war heroes, Mariscal Andrés A. Càceres, became president alter 
an intense power struggle and proceeded to reconstruct the country. The 
path chosen was an agreement with the British bondholders to capitalize 
the debt, called the "trace Contract". It consisted in handing over to the 
creditors the railroads, vast haciendas , rights to exploit certain 
services, three million tons of guano, and thirty-three annual payments of 
eighty thousand sterling pounds. 
Between 1890 and 1929, Perû enjoyed an export boom based on a wide 
range of raw materials: sugar, silver, cotton, rubber, copper, wool and oil. 
During this period the presence of foreign compànies, mainly from the 
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United States, becarne increasingly important. One of this enterprises, the 
Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, bought almost all the mines of the 
central Andes and the Standard Oil of New Jersey acquire in 1913 the oil 
deposits that made Perü one of the first world oil exportera and the most 
important South American producer until 1924, when it was surpassed by 
Venezuela. By 1926 the British domination of more than a century was 
over and the United States became Perû's first trade partner providing a 
market for more Chan one-third of its exports and supplying around half of 
its total imports. This is also a period of great land concentration in the 
coast (sugar and cotton plantations) and in the Andes (commercial sheep 
and cattle ranching). The latter reduced the lands of the peasant 
communities and consolidated the power of landowners who became 
physical intermediaries between the State and the vast Quechua speaking 
population. 
The roaring twenties and the ap earance of mass politics 
As it was for most of the world, 1929 was a critical year for Perû. The 
effects of the "crack" were fully felt in the country's economy. But this 
year was also the peak of mass politics. The dynamic export growth 
between 185 and 1919 brought political stability to Perf's incipient 
democracy based on a very small electorate and the so-called "aristocratic 
republic". Industrial growth in Lima and capitalist development in mines, 
oilfields and sugar estates concentrated the working class and favoured 
the development of trade unions. Strongly influenced by anarcho- 
syndicalism, the trade unions organized the first general strike in 1911 
demanding the eight-hour day, that was only obtained during a second 
general strike in 1919. 
After being elected that same year, President Augusto B. Leguia granted 
labour rights, developed the country's physical infrastructure and 
appointed a land comission to investigate peasant uprisings that took 
place in Puno in the early 1920's. During his latter years in power, 
however, he turned to a more repressive attitude and favoured foreign 
capital with too generous tax exemptions. He was finally overthrown by 
an obscure military man, Luis Sànchez Cerro, who had strong facist 
inclinations. By the end of Leguia's government the externat debt was 
tenfold and Per( subsequently defaulted in 1932, when more than 
two-thirds of its export earnings equalled its payment obligations. 
The 1920's also witnessed a debate that was to mark Peruvian politics 
until nowadays. The main actors were, on the one hand, José Carlos 
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Mariâtegui (1895-1930), founder of the Peruvian Socialist Party, later the 
Communist Party (PCP), and, on the other, Victor Ra(l Haya de la Torre 
(1895-1979), founder of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 
(APRA), currently in power under the leadership of President Alan Garcia. 
While the former managed to gather the bulk of trade unions under a 
central confederation of workers, the latter rapidly became the first 
mass political party in Per(, drawing its support from the lover middle 
class, students, and urban and rural workers. In the process, the death of 
Mari ,tegui in1930 (at the age of thirty-five) lead the PCP to sectarian 
marxist-leninist positions that alienated vast sectors of the population 
and confined the influence of the party to a small revolutionary Mite. 
Mariàtegui was the first thinker to attempt a systematic analysis of Latin 
American societies from a marxist perspective. He subscribed the view 
that Per( was a "semi-colonial country" but dissented from the 
Comintern's opinion that it was also a "feudal society" that needed a 
"national bourgeois revolution" before capitalisrn, and subsequently 
socialism, could become the dominant mode of production and social order. 
He contended that the Peruvian landlords were only "intermediaries of 
imperialism" totally uncapable of leading an independent development 
strategy. On the other hand, the local middle class weakness and racist 
attitudes made them incapable of assuming that task, which required the 
active participation of the indian masses. For him, the advanced stage of 
development of a world monofiuïistic capitalism made it useless to 
attempt an autonomous capitalist development. However, Mariàtegui was 
conscious Chat the small Peruvian working class was not sufficient to 
establish a marxist-lenninist vanguard party and stated that a 
peasant-working class alliance, though slow and difficult, was a 
pre-condition for revolution. The wretched illness that killed him and the 
intense pressure of the Cornintern to combat Haya de la Torre, frustrated 
his intention of building a marxist inspired movement, but at the same 
tirrme adapted to the complex realities of Per(. His intellectuel legacy, 
impressive for his short life, is widely respected in Per( and Latin 
America. 
Haya de la Torre began his political career as a student leader in Lima 
during the 1919 general striée. The five founding principles of his party 
were: struggle against "yankee imperialism"; the political unity of Latin 
America; the nationalization of land and industry; the internationalisation 
of the Panama Canal; and, solidarity with ail the oppressed peoples and 
classes of the world. Haya claimed that the main problem faced by 
"Indoamérica" was the alliance of the feudal landlords and imperialism. In 
his view, however, imperialism was the first stage of capitalism in the 
région rather than the last one as Lenin had stated. Therefore, a national 
anti--imperialist revolution was not only possible but necessary to 
organize a viable capitalist development. The main actor of such a 
revolution was to be trie middle class in alliance with the organized 
working class. [lis approach enabled him to create a mass political party 
in the country much more successfully than the one fostered by trie 
pro-Moscow sectarian followers of Mariàtegui.; Since its foundation in 
México in 1928, 1929 was a critical year for Perù trie APRA party 
remained, together with the Catholic Church and the Army, as one of the 
most influential institutions of the country. 
The return of the militar 
Between 1930 and 1939 Perû lived under military rule. In 1931, elections 
were cailed by a military junta that forced Sànchez Cerro to step down in 
view of growing social uni-est and allowed Haya de la Torre to return from 
exile. However, the elections were clearly fraudulent in favour of Sânchez 
Cerro, who ran as candidate. In 1932, APRA militants rose and held the 
city of Trujillo, in the northern coast, for two days. After a series of 
confusing events the military surrounded the City and shot thousands of 
Apristas. The subsequent feud between the APRA and the military lasted 
until trie late 1970's and forced thaï: party to long periods of ciandestinity 
and resulted in a continuous veto of the military on the entry of APRA into 
goverriment, until the elections of 1980 in which they actually lost in the 
poils. 
The period betwen 1945 and 1948 was the only occasion in which the 
APRA found itself close to exercising power, in 1939 the military called 
to elections alter banning APRA and trie PCP, and Manuel Prado, a Lima 
banker, won. Prado marked a brief interlude of political harmony, based on 
a modest export growth and his personai ability as negotiator. This 
interregnum allowed the APRA party to reorganize and support José Luis 
Bustarriante y Rivero to succeed Prado with Aprista support and 
participation in government. Mass mobilizations demanding radical 
reform, poor economic policy and Bustamante's Jack of political talent, 
precipitated another military coup in 1948. 
General Odria imposed a highly authoritarian dictatorship between 1948 
and 1956. APRA, PCP and the tracte unions were severely repressed and 
Haya de la Torre took refuge in the Colombian embassy in Lima and 
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remained there for around six years. In spite of the political misfortunes, 
the country entered into an era of great prospérity. Taking advantage of 
the long post world-war boom, Peruvian exports grew by around 10 % a 
year during the 1950's and then doubled this high growth in the early 
1960's. Odria, following the opposite direction of most Latin American 
countries, opened the country to foreign capital and cornplied with the 
rules of free tracte. This policy allowed the development of important 
mining resources with foreign capital while the flourishing fishing 
industry remained under local control. By the early 1960's Peri becarne 
the largest fishmeal producer in the world. 
DemQ_c_racv andcivilian reformnism 
In 1956 Manuel Prado was democratically elected and finished his 
constitutional mandate in 1962. In 1962, APRA's candidate Victor Rail 
EHaya de la Torrre end Fernando Be1aùnde, leader of a rather new parte called 
Accién Popular (AP), reached a deadlock during the elections due to the 
srnall différence in votes received by each one. Amidst allegations of 
fraud, the army intervened only to call elections a year after. However, 
during its brief rule, the military junta showed signs of a nationalist 
institutional inclination towards reform. It founded the national planning 
institute, built a state-owned refinery and applied a lirnited agrarian 
reform in two Cusco valleys affected by increasing social unrest, 
including an incipient guerrilla movement lead by the Trotskyte Hugo 
Blanco. 
Fernando Be l ainde took office in 1963 after w i nn i ng over APRA, w i th the 
support of the urban professional and middle classes that doubled during 
the 1950's up to the point of becoming 15 % of the country's workforce. 
The communist party as well as other leftist forces who saw in AP a 
means to hinder APRA's access to power also voted for Belainde. However, 
the APRA and General Odria's -followers, mortal enemies until less than a 
decade before, made an alliance to control Congress and systematically 
block Belainde's initiatives. In fact, the APRA had been substantially 
rnoderating its programme and demands for quite some Cime, in a move 
Chat followers describe as "tactical" and detractors as "opportunistic". At 
any rate, the alliance with Odria's followers to represent the oligarchic 
interests in Congress was too much for most of its radical followers, who 
defected to the left. One of this defectors, José de la Puente Uceda, 
founded a guerrilla movement under the inspiration of the Cuban revolution 
and lied fighting in the jungle.. 
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Belaûnde tried to promote moderate reform, and was very much inspired by 
President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress". He had to face two difficuit, 
long lasting, and highly sensitive national problems: the most unequal 
landholding structure in trie continent and the presence of the Standard 0i1 
under inadmissible legal conditions, especially with respect to tax 
payrnents to the Peruvian government. In his inaugural speech he promised 
to solve them both, the latter in ninety days, but in practice he was unable 
to do so in five years. Instead, he concentrated in a pet project to colonize 
the jungle and expand the agriculturai frontier, through the construction of 
a highway running the length of the country along the tropical. forest 
ringe. The project becarne the President's personal obsession and was 
transformed into a vast public investment programme financed with 
foreign )Dans, and centred on transport and irrigation projects, as well as 
improvements in education. 
A vague ideological cornrnitment, harsh opposition in Congress and an 
excessive willingne s to compromise, prevented Belaùnde's government 
from confronting the agrarian problem. By 1965 guerrilla warfare was 
pervading the rural areas and promoting )and invasions and peasant 
uprisings. Besides, the rapid expansion of higher education had 
strengthened the left, especially because of widespread frustration arnong 
provincial professional cadres who resented Lima's centralism and 
cultural prejudices as weil as APPA's new alignment. The situation 
worsened when Belainde ordered the army to suffocate guerrillas and 
peasant uprisings with counter-insurgency advice by the United States 
armed forces. 
But the issue that finally determined the fall of Belainde was the gross 
rnishandling of the controversial question of the Standard oii. The 
agreement that was finally signed in 1968 favoured the foreign company in 
such a way that aroused public protest from almost all sectors, including 
conservative ones. In virtue of that agreement, the company ceded control 
over the almost exhausted oiifields it had been exploiting to the small 
state oil company, but kept the refinery and its monopoly over fuel 
marketing in the country. However, what triggered widespread indignation 
was that the contract contained a crucial and secret "eleventh page" fixing 
the price at which the state company was bound to sel] the crude to 
guarantee the latter a rather excessive profit. The president of the state 
oil company denounced the existence of this secret pact, setting off à 
scandai that was used as justification by the military to stage a coup. 
Considering the Jack of popularity of the BelaCnde government at that 
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point, it was not difficult to forecast the victory of APRA in the imminent 
elections. Nevertheless, the military veto to that party prevailed once 
again. 
Military-reformism: the Velasco years 
The military government led by General Juan Velasco was clearly different 
from previous de facto ru] ings, since it was an institutional project, not a 
persona] venture. In fart, the military had been progressively preparing 
themselves for a more active participation in different spheres of national 
lite with the intention of governing directly if the civil political c/1t6 
was unable to do so. Through the establishment of the "Centro de Altos 
Estudios lllitares" (CAEM), and a military inteligence service in the 
1950's, the army developed contacts with intellectual currents supporting 
a nationaiist perspective for Peruvian development. Lacking the ciass 
exclusiveness and elitist attitudes of other services, the arrny was more 
sensitive to the country's social probiems and development. dilemmas. The 
guerrilla episode increased the sensitivity of young officers to the reality 
of a social and econornic order that was dividing the country and posed a 
threat to national security. 
Aware of the political sensitivity of the issue and the symbolic content 
for the population, the first act of the military governrent was to occupy 
the northern oilfields and expropriate the refinery. The measure provoked 
universal acclaim and legitimatized the military intervention in the eyes 
of a vast portion of the population. 
Influenced by the development strategy proposais of the United Nations 
Economic Comission for Latin America (ECLA) and intellectually supported 
by Peruvian civilian "ideologists" and technocrats, the military opted for a 
"non-communist and non-capitalist" path to development. Both the 
traditional oligarchic groups and the radical left were displaced from the 
political arena in favour of a "third option", that was described as "social 
dernocracy of full participation". In the end, what the Velasco government 
did was to implement the original APRA programme, already abandoned by 
that party for some time, probably with the aim of purging the country of 
Aprismo. The Communist Party, the Christian Democrats and other minor 
political groups provided "critical support" to the military under General 
Velasco and in many instances actively participated in government. 
During the period of Velasco's leadership the main tenets of the radical 
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programme of the military were: agrarian reform, reduction of foreign 
ownership in the exploitation of natural resources and basic industries, 
reforms in industry to allow workers' ownership and participation in 
profits, impulse to a new sector of self-management called "social 
property", development of a state capitalism, educational and social 
reform, and a stronger presence of Perû in the international political 
grena, defending a Third--World and non-aligned position. 
Much has been written about the Peruvian agrarian reform. More radical 
than any other similar policy attempted in the continent, including trie 
first Cuban land reform law, the 1969 agrarian reform was aimed, from a 
political perspective, at solving an ancient and crucial problem pointed 
out, among others, by Haya de la Torre and Mariàtegui. Suffice it to say 
that before 1968 one per cent of the landowners controlled close to 80% of 
the arable land. At the tune, a widely held point of view contended that 
such a measure would not only neutralise the threat of peasant-based 
subversion, but would also expand agricultural production, increase rural 
employment and, consequently, expand the countryside market for 
manufactured goods. 
Good intentions notwithstanding, these aims proved both contradictory and 
impossible to achieve in the framework of strict state control imposed 
over agriculture. Securing cheap food for the urban population in order to 
facilitate industrialisation keeping salaries low and avoiding working 
class unrest, were placed as priorities over agricultural development. 
Lack of adequate credit facilities and technical support, internai problems 
in the collectivized enterprises in the Coast and the Andes, a massive 
emigration of agronomists and their subsequent replacement by inefficient 
and obstructive state bureaucrate, contributed to the disastrous 
performance of the sector for more than a decade. 
The government also embarked on a series of expropriations and 
nationalisations of major foreign firms in mining, agro-industry, fishing, 
banking, electricity, transport and communications. Whereas in 1968 
three-quarters of mining, a third of the fishing industry, two-thirds of the 
commercial banking system, and half of manufacturing industry were 
under foreign control, in 1975 the Peruvian state was responsable for more 
than half of the mining output, ail the fishing industry except minor 
artisanal activities, two-thirds of the banking system, a fifth of 
industriel production and haif of total productive investment. Besides, its 
share of exports rose to around 907o, even though a large portion of these 
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exports corresponded to minerais and oil marketed but not extracted by 
the public enterprises. Basic industries like cernent, paper, chemicals, 
glass and shipbuilding were reserved to the state, and the private sector 
could only invest in them through joint ventures with public enterprises. 
These measures notwithstanding, the military displayed efforts to attract 
direct foreign investment to the activities in which it was considered 
indispensable. The Southern Perû Copper Corporation (SPCC), which 
exploited the southern copper ore of Toquepala since the 1950's was not 
expropriated because it managed to raise US$ 550 million to develop the 
Cuajone copper mine, the major possible source of foreign exchange in the 
late 1960's. The government also allowed foreign companies to operate in 
the jungle oil fields provided they signed the "Peruvian Model Oil 
Contract", by which the foreign firrns incurred exploration and 
development costs in return for haif of the oil production, `hile the other 
haif,vent to trie public enterprise PETROPERU. In trie ranufacturing 
industry the foreign firrns were allowed to operate provided they complied 
with the provisions of Decision 24 of the Andean Pact, by which they had 
to suhmit applications for new investments, register ail investment in the 
country, obtain government approval for technology contracts and 
reinvestrrment, lirait their profit repatriation, and had restricted access to 
local and external crédit. Decision 24 also required that foreign-owned 
f irriris follow â âivestrrient programme to gradually reduce foreign 
shareholdings to a maximum of 49%. The latter only had a very limited 
application. 
A General Law of Industries was the legal framework to introduce reforms 
in the private manufacturing sector, through the establishment of 
incentives according to a "four-priority" system. The law was 
supplemented by the "Industrial Community Law" which established the 
system of "labour communities" to allow workers' participation in 
management, profits and ownership, with the aim of reaching a 50% of 
labour shareholding. Aiso, the government promoted in 1974 a "social 
Property Sector" of state-sponsored worker-owned enterprises inspired by 
the Yugoslavian model and the ideas about self-managed firms of Jaros,lav 
Vanek. Intended to be the predominant sector of the economy, the social 
property sector never received enough support to achieve even more 
modest goals and no more than fifty of these enterprises were set up. The 
private sector, with few exceptions, opposed the reformas as well as the 
"labour stability law" which gave labourers job security after only three 
months of service. As with the agrarian reform, these attempts to modify 
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the rules of the game in the industrial sector were in conflict with the 
goals pursued by the government. The high colts and risks of hiring 
workers and advantageous tax incentives to reinvestment resulted in 
capital intensive industries that generated little employment and 
increased pressure on the balance of payments due to rising imports of 
capital goods and inputs, The macroeconomic policy also reinforced 
perverse eftects since the overvalued local currency, low rates of interest 
and high tariff barriers as well as competitive imports prohibition 
favr,ured capital flies, lowered internat savings and suppor'ted a highly 
incarripetitive and inefficierit industry. 
In spite of trie efforts of previous governments and the significant 
expansion of the educational budget under the first Belaûnde government, 
rriore than twenty-five per cent of the Peruvian c_hiidren never entered a 
prirnary school in 1970, while only a third started secondary éducation and 
fevv ever cornpleted it, Around 7J0 é of the population wrvere illiterate, and 
trie majority of thern were women living in the rural areas. The 
government envisaged educational reform as a pre-condition for the 
rriodeernisation of the country and asked a group of civilians, mostly 
rimernbers of the srnall Social Progressive Movernent, to design an 
educational strategy for the country. Strongly influenced by the ideas of 
the Mexican Ivàn Illich and the Brazilian Paulo Freire, the group tried to 
f ester ëduCation for vi, ork in thé context 0f an underaeveloped country. 
Co-education was introduced, free textbooks distributed in low income 
areas, and participatory schernes designed to incorporate community 
organizations, students, teachers and parents in the educational process. 
opposition by the middle clans, bureaucratic inefficiency, Jack of 
adequate budgets and strong politicization of the teachers, who under a 
Maoist perspective labeled the goverriment as "fascist", h1ri(Per-ed trie 
application of the reform. 
The combination of this half-baked school reforrn with the absurd 
expansion of higher education due to the proliferation of bad quality 
universities, proved to be highly explosive, since it pr omoted a "révolution 
of rising e:x;pectations" that had no r elationship with the countrie's 
realities in terms of social mobility, employment and income. 
Profession ally 111-prepared for highly qualified jobs and °overqualified" 
for more accessible ores, a mass of school and university graduates found 
itself in the frustrating situation of not being able to find an occupation 
suitable to its aspirations and turned to political groups that advocated a 
violent solution to the country's problems. 
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The regime's foreign affairs policy was seen as an important tool to break 
dependency on the United States without falling into the Soviet sphere of 
influence, The new policy included the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with socialist countries, rnost of them severed during trie 
Belaùnde government urder the pressure of the United States; the active 
participation in trie proposai to lift the OAS sanctions to Cuba; the active 
support of integrations schernes, especially the Andean Part; and the 
defense of trie two-hundred-nautical-mile jurisdiction over natural 
resources. 
The "Second Phase of the Peruvian Revolution" 
By the rmmid-1970's the military government had reached a critical 
trjrning-point: on the one hand, the severe econornic crisis was forcing a 
policy definition that was postponed for years thanks to external credit 
from private Banks; on the other, the failure of the military to obtain 
support from the middle class, business and the poor was generating an 
unsustainable power struggie that required an urgent alliance with nome 
sectors of the population, Certainly, during the first two years in office, 
tige trade unions, large segments of the middle class, nome entrepreneurial 
sectors and several intellectuais were sympathetic to the regime, but 
enthusiasrll warned with the reforms, and especially with the expropriation 
of the media (newspapers and television channels) in 1974, allegedly to 
turn it over to the "organized interest groups", such as tracte unions and 
teacbers. 
Ailing and increasingly authoritarian, General Velasco was in no position 
to provide adequate leadership in such a critical period. The military were 
divided in factions that either supported or rejected a radicalisation of 
the revolution, the economy was suffering from faltering growth rates, 
declining private investment, rising inflation, a large balance of payments 
deficit and acute shortages of basic consomption goods. 
But one of the mort pressing problems was the extérnal debt. The 
government's failure to mobilise internai resources for its ambitious 
projects, the low internai investment rate, the inorganic printing of money 
to cover food and fuel subsidies, and the United States-inspired embargo 
on multilaterai loans to Perti, forced the military to turn to the 
international private banks that provided short-term "petrodollar" loans at 
high interest rates and spreads. The public sector foreign debt doubled 
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between 1972 and 1975, reaching US$ 3.5 billion, with a dramatic increase 
in the shore of exports that had to be used for servicing it. Moreover, due 
to the government's policies, exports were declining and the international 
prices reducing its value. The upsurge of right-wing dictatorships in 
several South American countries, particularly the coup against President 
Allende in Chile, further aggravated the debt crisis because the Peruvian 
military feit progressively isolated in the region and considered 
indispensable a massive arms purchase from the Soviet Union. 
In raid-1975 General Francisco Morales Bermûdez overthrew Velasco in a 
bloodless coup. Trained as an economist, Morales Bermûdez opted for an 
orthodox economic stabilization programme and sought to correct the 
gross economic mismanagement of the "first phase" of the revolution in 
which hie actively participated as rninister of econorny and finance. In 
spite of his assurances that the revolution's ideology, principles and 
programme rdould remain untouched in what he labelled the "second phase" 
of trie rnilitary rule, he quickly displaced the most radical officers and 
proceeded to disrnantle the reforms in the industrial sector. However, trie 
irnplernentation of trie stabilization programme was extremely difficult 
because of rising social instability. After several failed attempts to 
reach an agreement with the international Monetary Fund and a succession 
of ministers of economy and finance, Morales Bermûdez finaily 
implemented most of the required measures, including wage and import 
controls, devaluation of the local currency, and price and tax rises. 
The policy had a negative effect on employment, income and production. 
Cross Domestic Product fell by 1.2 % in 1977 and 1.8 % in 1978, the 
manufacturing sector suffered the effects of scarce credit and reduced 
dernand as real wages fell by around 40 % between 1974 and 1978. 
Unemployment and under-employment rose from 46 % to 54 % of the 
workforce between 1975 and 1977, according to official figures. Inflation 
soared to 70 % in 1978 when most of the subsidies and price controls 
moere eliminated, and food prices increased more than the price index as a 
whole. A study of low income families indicated that the average calorie 
intake fell by 22 between 1972 and 1979 to onlÿ 62 % of the 
internatiolly recommended minimum level. 
In spite of these austerity measures, the fiscal deficit did not decrease, 
public enterprises were not privatised, and arms purchases rernained 
significantly high. Starting in 1976, a series of strikes and the 
subsequent violent repression of the military, including deportations, 
carefew and detentions of political and trade-union leaders, progressively 
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generated a general and organized opposition to Morales Bermûdez's 
government. Finally, a general strike in August 1977 forced the military 
to announce a timetable for a réturn to civilian rule. The first step was to 
cail elections for a constitutent assernbly to draft a new constitution in 
raid-1978, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 1980. 
A nerr Constitution and an olresident 
The constitutional assembly elections took place in the rnidst of popular 
agitation to oppose the harsh economic measures and government 
repression. The leftist parties obtained around 30 % of the vote, the 
highest in Peruvian history, APRA 35 % and the conservative Partido 
Popular Cristiano (PPC) reached 24 %, because of the last-minute decision 
of Fernando Belande to boycott the poli. The elections were truly 
dernocratic and allowed 18 year-olds to vote for the first time, but 
excluded aproximately two million aduit illiterates. 
The yearl978 was a rather peculiar one. In May, Perù was among the 
countries with the worst payments position in the world and on the verge 
of open default. That same month social unrest was reaching its peak and 
seriously threatened the return to dernocracy. However, during the second 
half of that saine year, the constituent assernbly, under the experienced 
and skillful command of the mortally-111 Haya de la Torre, had defused 
rnuch of trie socio--political pressure while a boom in the prices of Perû's 
major exports as well as the positive effects of the stabilization policy 
on manufactured exports, drastically changed the situation of the balance 
of payments. Largely the result of the technical skills of the minister of 
economy and finance, .davier Silva Ruete, and the president of the Central 
Batik, Manuel Moreyra, both appointed in May, the new situation allowed the 
government to repay part of the country's foreign debt ahead of schedule 
and restore external credit. 
The return to dernocracy under a new constitution and the upturn in the 
economy, allowed Morales Bermûdez to stage the presidential and parliamentary elections in a more peaceful and relaxed atmosphere. The 
death of Haya de la Torre immediately after the constituent assembly had 
left APRA in a difficult positions due to interna] struggles for succession, 
while the leftist groups failed to articulate a common front. Fernando 
Belaùnde took advantage of these divisions and launched a masterly 
campaign, based on skillful utilisation of the media, his own 
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personal charisma and the advantage of having maintained a position of 
principle against the military through the abstention of participating in 
the constituent assembly "convoked by the de facto rulers". 
A clear victory with 45 % of the presidential poil allowed Belaùnde to 
return to power after ten years of exile and twelve since he was 
overthrown. The country that Belaûnde took over in July 1980 was 
substantially different from the one he was forced to leave in 1968. The 
expansion of the rote of the state to control the economy, the existence of 
more than 170 state corporations, the emergence of powerful new 
business consortia and a rnyriad of informai small and rnediurn 
enterprises, were sonne of the novel features of Peruvian society. 
Within two years of Belaùnde taking office, raw material prices 
plummeted to their lowest levels since the 1930's, and the balance of 
payrnents became a disaster area. But the problern lied in trie economic 
policy implemented by the Chairman of the Cabinet, Manuel Ulloa, the rnost 
influentiai figure during the first two years of the adminsitration. Ulloa 
appointed a group of young technocrate heavily influenced by the "Chicago 
School" to key posts, to develop a free market strategy based on three 
policies. First, a massive transfer of resources to the private sector 
through credit and the sale of two--thirds of the public corporations. 
Second, a drastic reduction of state subsidies, tariffs and intervention in 
the financial system as well as the elimination of price controls and 
import prohibitions. Third, a fostering of direct foreign investment to 
increase raw materials exports throug a series of tax incentives. 
Mini-devaluations were to maintain international competitiveness of 
Peruvian exports. Much in fine with IMF and World Bank thinking, the new 
Peruvian government received ample support from these institutions, 
including the preparation of a meeting with the consultative group in Paris 
to discuss an irresponsible proposai involving US$ 11 billion worth 
projects. 
Ulloa's policies failed to achieve their objectives. The abrupt opening of 
the Peruvian rnarket did not allow any possibility of adjûstment to local 
manufacturing enterprises, and many were swept entirely from the 
market. The plans to sel i state enterprises were indefinitely postponed 
because the newly appointed government managers developed a vested 
interest in maintaining them as public, while the private sector showed 
little interest in buying them. Furthermore, Belaûnde never abandoned his 
intentions to launch a massive construction drive, thus increasing public 
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investment on public works and infrastructural projects. Since Ulloa's 
technical team refused to raise taxes on private business, a large share of 
state expenditure was financed with inorganic money printing and foreign 
loans. When the latter disappeared in 1983, the government unfairly 
competed with the private sector for financial resources negatively 
affecting productive activities. 
Between 1981 and 1983, manufacturing input fell by more than 20 and 
by 1934 it was operating at only 40 % capacity. Textiles, the tore of 
Peruvian manufacturing, suffered the worst crisis of its history due to 
import liberalization and widespread contraband. The vehicle assembly, 
enginneering and leather goods industries were also hardly hit. In 
contrast, financial groups were booming because the rate of return on 
financial investrnents was much higher than that from capital investrnent 
in the productive sector. The thon privately-owned Banco de Crédit, 
increased its profit by seventy-eight % to US$ 23 million in 1981. 
f-lowever, less well-managed Banks were unable to surmount the impending 
crisis and their bad debts, mostly to related enterprises, mounted and 
were subsequently taken over by the state or simply liquidated. 
In spite of the négative effects of such policies and its inconsistencies, 
the first two years of the Belaûnde government witnessed moderate 
growth. But 1983 was quite a different story up to the point of being 
called "the worst year since the Pacific War". That year natural disasters, 
provoked by changes in the sea-currents that run along the Peruvian toast, 
devastated much of the country. The phenomenon, commonly known as the 
current, caused landslides and floods in normally dry areas, droughts 
in rainy ones, destroying crops, houses, towns, irrigation facilities, fish 
and seafood cultures as vieil as altering fishing activities. Oil refineries, 
ronds and urban services in the toast were also seriously affected. These 
resulted in acute food shortages and enormous costs for reconstruction 
and aid to the affected populations. 
By 1984 the Peruvian economy collapsed. Part of a broader crisis that 
exploded with the Mexican default in 1982, Perù was ünable to obtain 
foreign resources to tope with the enormous problerns of the 1983 
disasters, IHowever, the effects of the crisis were particularly severe in 
Perû because the Belaunde government combined three disastrous policier; 
liberalisation of trade that ended in a significant loss of foreign exchange 
reserves, a concentration of resources in the exploitation of raw 
materials in a moment of low prices, and a construction drive that 
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contributed to deteriorate further the balance of payments. Large-scale 
arrns imports continued, culrninating with an agreement to buy 26 mirage 
fighters worth US$ 700 million. As a consequence, Perû's external debt 
increased from US$6.7 billion in 1980 to US$ 8.2 billion in 1983, while 
o'ver the same period the total external debt grew from US$ 9.6 billion to 
US$ 12.4 billion. This meant that the debt service was absorbing more 
than 50% of export earnings in the period. 
After the resignation of Manuel Ulloa in 1982, the monetarist tendency 
predominated and the former minister's pragmatism was definitely 
abandoned. His successor, Carlos Rodriguez Pastor, imposed severe 
austerity mi easures and declared that the debt would be payed at any cost. 
However, the increasing social unrest and the rising terrorist activities of 
5 7 / ro Lumi'7r so forced the government to seek a change. The writer 
Mario Vargas Llosa was offered the presidency of the cabinet, but he 
finally refused it and the new minister, José Benavides, an engineer with 
no economic skills, finally signed an agreement with the IMF that was 
little différent from the one proposed by Rodriguez Pastor. Despite 
successive reschedulings, Perù faced debt interest payments amounting 
US$ 9 billion, and a sirrnilar sum in repayment of the principal in the 
following five years. 
In 1983, imports fell around 30%. However, a further fall in export 
earneings determined that Perü's debt repayrnent obligations outstripped 
its capacity to pay. Reschedulings were costly and conditions harsh. Even 
alter the rescheduling Perû had to pay more than four dollars out of every 
ten earned from exports to cover debt service obligations in 1983. Failure 
to meet iMF obligations, determined the rescinding of the agreement in 
October of that year. Near elections and increased terrorist activity by 
Sond2ro Lurrninosq the government completely lost political support. 
Discontent was already evident in the municipal elections of 1983, when 
Alfonso Barrantes leader of the left parties's conglomerate called the 
"United Left" (IU), was elected as the first Marxist mayor of Lima. 
However, the resuits of the 1985 elections showed.the lack of popularity 
of Belaûnde's party, since it slightly surpassed 5% ôf the votes, the 
minimum percentage to remain as a legal political organization. 
If the economic record of Belaûnde is not good, his political achievements 
have to be recognised as positive. The organization of impecable 
municipal and presidential elections, restoration of formai democratic 
freedoms, devolution of media, and the search for a "social pact" with 
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participation of labour unions and entrepreneurs were important gains for 
Peruvian society. 
The Alan Garcia landslide 
When Peruvians went to the poils in 1985, the vast majority, more than 
50%, voted for the 37-year old APRA candidate Alan Garcia. July of that 
same year was a historical month for the country: it was the first time 
for 40 years that one constitutionally elected president passed over power 
to another. lt was also the first time that the APRA party reached the 
presidential palace. 
One of the first announcements of the neebillion e ected president was bis 
intention to limit repayment on its US$ to 10% of export 
earnings. Besides, lie made clear statements about the emphasis his 
government would give to long-term planning, agricultural development in 
the Andes, income redistribution and industrial growth. Respect for human 
rights and freedom of the press were also political priorities for his 
period. 
President Garcia, based on a strategy ellaborated by a group of advisers, 
opted fora heterodox ï-iiacro-economic policy, intended to push high growth 
rates. Since there is littie prospect of reaching an export boom, the policy 
instruments for this purpose are - to pay salary increases and raise 
government expenditures, even at the cost of high public deficits. The goal 
is to create a dynamic cycle of growth, in which large suros of investment 
and resources would be directed to remove pockets of extreme poverty and 
backwardness, upgrading economic performance, efficiency and 
productivity, and improving the utilisation of scarce resources. In order 
to recover the ground lost in the last decade, the Larget of Garcia's 
administration is to reach an average growth of 6% per annum for the 
period 1986-1990. 
The shift in income is being done through salary increases and public 
spending in poor areas. Another component of the strategy is to continue 
providing for the profitability of agriculture, which implies net transfers 
to rural producers, cooperative workers, small farmers and cattle-raisers. 
One of the measures taken is the reduction of interest rates on a selective 
basis, to favour the poorest rural areas. 
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The government does not believe that the marketplace is the best way of 
allocating scarce resources according to those targets. Therefore, they 
contend that the State has to somehow control two of the scarce 
resources, profits and domestic savings, or at least be able to decisively 
influence or direct investment decisions. The priority sectors for these 
investments are explicit: production of articles for massive consumption, 
industrial inputs and capital goods, and export industries with a high 
aggregated value. The other scarce resource, foreign exchange, is also 
tightly controlled through irnport licenses and maximum annual quotas. 
Garcia's governrent was successful in controlling inflation through price 
controls and a fixed exchange rate. However, during 1987 inflationary 
pressures reappeared and price controls are becoming progressively 
difficult to rnaintain, since violations of the law and "black markets" are 
r,ow widespread. Real salary increases have been so far met with an 
incrernent in the utilisation of installed capacity. However, the impact of 
increased imports of inputs and capital goods on the balance of payments 
is severe. Reserves are dropping vert' fast creating the risk of irnport 
bottlenecks and shortages of goods. If further salary and government 
expenditure increases are made, something very likely, hyperinflation 
will be inevitable. 
This means that the reactivation of the economy in 1986, with an overali 
record growth rate of more triai) 8 fo and production increases in almost ail 
sectors, will not be repeated in 1987. The controversiai expropriation of 
the remaining private banks has complicated matters for the government. 
The measure, aimed at controlling the "scarce resources" as defined by the 
team of economic advisers, triggered a strong debate that has polarized 
the population, including the APRA party itself. 111 ega 1 procedures and the 
secrecy in which the decision was adopted (most ministers did not know 
about the measure until it was officially announced) provoked a strong 
reaction in différent sectors of the population. The President was forced 
by the Judiciary to step back and suspend illegal interventions, and to pass 
the law in Congress. After heated and prolonged debates, the APRA 
majority prevailed but legal and media battles are still in full force. In 
fact, more than one banker has refused to leave its bank until the 
constitutionally guaranteed compensation is duly payed. 
There iS a wide consensus that the government made a political 
miscalculation with respect to the expropriation of the banks. The 
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President's credibility in the business community has diminished 
substantially, because he pubticly declared on several occasions that no 
banking expropriations would take place during his mandate. The 
intensification of terrorist activities, including a rebellion in several 
Lima prisons in June 1986, are also deteriorating the President's image, 
because of the government's inability to control political violence within 
the democratic system's rules. Claims of human rights violations have 
increased again, while the relations between Garcia and the military are 
embittered by trie creation of a unique Ministry of Defence to replace the 
former rninistries of the arrny , the navy, and the air force, without 
consulting with the higher Tanks. 
There are indications that the government is reconsidering its economic 
strategy, although it is not clear which direction will take. Comrnitment 
to original priorities is very clear and the advances of the agricultural 
sector and the process of econornic and administrative decentralisation 
are proofs of this, Part Il of this document contains a more detailed 
analysis of these priorities and critical development issues. 
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!A N-D-EY£LOPMENT 155U[ 
1.-P_PULAJ0-M 
Population policies 
Currently Perû has more than 20 million inhabitants and is the fifth most 
populous country in Latin America after Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and 
Colorribia. From this total, 40.57o are 15 years old or younger and roughly 
54 % uncier 20. The annual growth rate was 2.9% for the period 1961-1972 
and is currently est.irriated in 2.6%. 
The demographic trend in Perû can be divided into three phases: rapid 
depopuiation between 1530 and 1750; moderate growth up to the end of 
the nineteenth century; and accelerated growth during this century. 
Population grew annuaily by roughly 1% in the 1750-1876 period and by 
1.4-1.5% between 1876 and 1940, mainly because of changes in the 
rnortality rate. Governments' efforts to expand heaith services and 
erradicate epidernic diseases contributed to reduce the death rate from 
around 33 per thousand in 1876 to 27 per thousand in 1940. The death rate 
was cut to an estimated 14 per thousand for 1970-1975, and in 1981 was 
reduced to 12 per thousand. One of the most important factors explainng 
the fail in death rates has been the reduction of infant mortaiity. The 
estimated life expectancy at birth rose from 30 to alrnost 36 years 
between 1876 and 1940, and in 1981 to 58 years, sti l1 below the Latin 
American average of 62 years. 
Between 1940 and 1972 the annual growth rate constantly increased from 
around 1.8 to 2.9% and total population more than doubled. Since the 
beginning of the 1960's, birth rates seem to be gradually declining, but not 
yet enough to offset the reduction in death rates, and to reduce the rate of 
natural increase. Population growth in Perû is stili among the fastest in 
Latin America and the country also has one of the highest child dependency 
ratios of the region. The total fertility rate has declined from 6.5 in 1970 
to around 5 in the early 1980's and the net reproduction rate is weli over 
twice as large as replacement level fertility. 
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The important changes in demographic trends that Perù has been going 
through in the last 30-35 years pose an enormous challenge for the 
country's development prospects, especially in terms of the critical 
parameters of socio-economic development. Studies indicate that if the 
fertility rates do not decline or decline slowly, Perû will be facing serious 
constraints on future development imposed by the natural resource 
endowrnent (energy gaps, population pressure in cultivable areas, water 
shortages in the coast, etc,); the difficulties in raising incornes in rural 
areas; and the large demand for infrastructure as Well as for public 
services in urban areas. One indicator of this is the fast increase in 
population density that rose from six to 12 inhabitants per square 
kilometre between 1950 and 1980. 
Attaining a lower demographic growth rate require that a specific 
population policy be fully integrated into Perû's development strategy. It 
is difficult to point out with any precision the causes of the changes in 
birth rates. The most accepted hypothesis is that better socio-economic 
conditions which reduce infant and maternai rnortality will tend to 
increase the fertility rates at the beginning, but with further 
improvements, more education and a higher female labour participation, 
fertility will tend to drop, However, the Peruvian case seems to confirm 
Chat to accelerate the fail in fertility to significant levels, it is 
indispensable to complement socio-economic improvements with farnily 
planning programmes. 
Until 1985, Peruvian governments refused to acknowledge the population 
problem. In 1976 the Second Phase of the military government timidly 
expressed its awareness of the importance of population policy, but little 
concrete action was taken. Partly due to the fact that politicians were 
sincerely convinced that this was the case, but mainly because they were 
anxious to avoid a confrontation with the influential catholic church, 
revious governments limited themselves to state that Perû was a 
"depopulated" country and that more inhabitants were needed to "conquer 
its vast and rich territory". Isolated efforts, like the one that originated 
the census of 1940, did not find any significant political backing with 
respect to defining a population policy. 
Research Institutional development 
The Jack of political support to agencies that worked in the field is 
reflected in the , institutional development of population research and 
family planning. In 1964, the Centre for Studies of Population and 
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Development (CEPD) was established to research population-related issues 
and promote family planning programmes with support of the Ministry of 
Health; the government, however, stopped its support in 1969. In 1967, 
the Peruvian Association for Family Planning (APPF) was founded and 
opened clinics throughout the country; in 1975 the government ordered the 
institution to close its operations. In 1976, the military government 
approved a document on "Policy Guidelines for a Population Policy" but did 
not go any further. Finally, a group of experts working in the public 
sector managed, first, to create a "National Population Council" in 1980 to 
replace the CEPD, and, second, to pass a "National Population Law" in 
Congress, in February, 1985. 
The Jack of officiai interest notwithstanding, research on population was 
constant since the m id-1960's in non-governmental organizations. 
Institutions like the Asociaciôn Multidisciplinaria de Investigaciôn y 
Docencia en Poblaciôn (AMIDEP) and the Instituto Andino de Estudios en 
Poblaclôn y Desarroilo (INANDEP), played an important rote in carrying out 
research and promotion activities, as well as in providing human resources 
to the goverrnrfient when the officiai view of the problem changed. 
It was only with the APRA government, however, that the issue was 
pubiicly acknowledged as a serious problem by the highest government 
authlorities, arid the president himself proposed to discuss it in a more 
responsibie manner. Aiso, the change in the attitudes of a significant 
portion of the Peruvian Catholic priests, especially those that are in 
direct contact with extreme poverty, has favoured the implémentation of 
certain realistic policies oriented to reduce the fertility rate, including an 
ambitious educational campaign with the support of severai international 
development institutions. A taboo subject in most circles less than a 
décade ago, the population problem is now confronted more pragmaticaliy 
by important sectors of Peruvian society, and receives more attention as 
weil as politisai support from the government. However, it is too soon to 
judge the impact of such policies and if this trend will continue in a 
sustained manner. 
Estimates of the Institute of National Planning indicate that, if current 
population policies are adequately implemented, in the year 2000 Per ù 
wili have 27 million inhabitants, 62 Po of which will be between 15 and 64 
years old. The same source considers that the growth rate will gradually 
decrease from the present 2.6 ô to 1.8% per annum during that period. 
However, these figures correspond to an "optlmist" hypothesis in which 
the fail in fertility rates would be rapid. The "pessimist" hypothesis is 
that if current growth rates remain more or less constant, the country's 
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population in year 2000 would be 31.5 million. 
Migration 
Pertr has also been going through a process of massive migration and 
spatial redistribution of its population. In 1940 around 35% of the total 
population lived in rural areas and it is estimated that in 1985 less'than 
30 fo remained in the countryside. This means that during that period the 
urban population grew from 2.5 million to more than 13 million 
inhabitants. Due to this migration process the growth of urban population 
(defined as those living in towns of more than 2000 inhabitants) has been 
accelerating rapidiy and the yearly rate for the 1970's and early 1980's is 
estimated at around 5.6 ô. Recent studies show very slight declines but 
the current rate is still over 5% per annum. 
The region that has had a relatively larger loss of population is the: Andes, 
where 65% of the total population lived in 1940 and only 40 fo remained in 
1981. in turn, the coast increased from 28% to 50% in the saine period. 
The Amazonian region, with 56% of the territory, only increased its 
participation from 77o in 1940 to 10% in 1981. 
Although in aggregate terms the direction of migration has been from rural 
to urban areas, there seem to be two parallel movements: from rural to 
rather small urban areas and from there to large urban centres. Thus, 
according to data of the mid-1970's, Lima received over half of its 
migrants from towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants (where approximately 
one-quarter of the total population lives); over 70% of its total migrants 
came from the Andes; and for most it was the only movement of their 
entire lives. In contrast, the Arequipa department, where the country's 
second largest city is located, sent over 70% of Its immigrants to Lima 
and recived over 659 of its immigrants from the cities of Puno and Cusco, 
are less urbanized and poorer cities in the Andes. On the other hand, 
Puno and Cusco received over 70% of their migrants from other provinces 
within the departments where they are located. 
The migration process appears to be highly selective, The average migrant 
tends to be young, risk-taking, with an above average education and not of 
the poorest income group of its native community. There are indications 
that the botter educated tend to go to the larger urban centres. Even 
though it is difficult to determine whether urban "pull" factors are more 
important than rural "push" factors, these characteristics of the average 
migrant sucggest that the attraction of botter job and income opportunities 
are probably more important than the "push" factors of extreme poverty. 
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The available evidence indicates that the overwhelming majOrity of trie 
migrants perceive that they have irnproved their living conditions. This 
perception of irnprovement increases with the amount of education the 
migrant has had and the longer he has lived in the *city. The extremely 
large climatic and cultural differences of the country make the adaptation 
of the migrant a very difficult and painful process. This is why the 
presence of relatives or friends is an important factor in determining the 
target city. 
Migration poses several challenges to Peruvian society: concentration of 
the best human resources in very few cities and the subsequent need for 
employr gent, trie st.rong demand for public social services, the enormous 
cost of urban development, the abandonnent of agricultural, commercial 
and professional activities where they are badly needed, and the 
Increasing difficulty to break this vicious circle and decentralise the 
country's economic activities. 
There is a broad consensus that continuous research is required in most 
topics linked to population, such as migration and fertility, but also that 
technical options for cheap and adequate housing are urgent. Officiai 
agencies are stressing the need to improve the available information 
through better methodologies of data collection and the use of computers 
for cit_rick processing and more accurate projections. 
2.-URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
The urbanization process in Perû has three outstanding features: 
movement to the coastal areas, increased concentration in larger cities, 
and overwhelming primacy of Lima. More recently, the trends have been 
gradually changing, with the intermediate cities absorbing an increasingly 
larger Share of migrants, 
In general_ terms, this process of rapid migration and urbanization is the 
consequence of the modrnization of the economy. Up to World War Il, 
agricultural investment concentrated in the coast because its river 
valleys had more fertile soli than the Andes and transportation to local 
and overseas markets were easier. This, coupled with the stagnation of 
the Sier=ra's mining centres and commercial activity, triggered migration 
from the Andes to the coast and the progressive concentration of 
population in this area also concentrated political power, attracting the 
attention of governments. In the post-war period, the process of 
industrialisation and the improvement of communications with the Andes 
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further reinforced trie trend. 
In the toast, two basic typés of cities emerged from this process. On the 
one hand a series of "dynamic cities" developed where land, water and port 
facilities were available to complement a main highly profitable activity, 
allowing economic growth and urbanization (e.g. Trujillo and Piura, where 
rich soit favoured the development of profitable cotton and sugar exports, 
Chimbote with the fishmeal boom in the 1960's). On the other, a series of 
other cities developed around one exclusive economic activity in places 
where vert' poor natural complementary factors imposed constraints to 
further development (e,g, the city of Talara built around the oil production 
in the midst of a desert where water and arable land are too scarce to 
allow further development). 
The staggering primacy of Lima over the rest of the urban centres is easy 
to explain. One of the main reasons is the extreme concentration of ai] the 
administrative apparatus since the Colonial period, because economic 
activities that developed in other areas of the toast and the Andes depend 
on Lima for finance, decision-making and inputs. This established a vicious 
circle because Lima gradually concentrated investment, human resources 
and power, and this, in turn, biased government policies in its favour 
a stronger attraction for the country's resources. Currently 
Lima concentrates slightly less than one-third of the country's total 
population, 80'f'70 of the banking activity, 70% of industry, more than 70% of 
medical doctors and more than 90% of total private investment. If the 
present trend continues Lima will increase its present population of 
approxlmat.ely six million inhabitants to 11 million in year 2000. 
Community organization and the informai sector 
According to data of the eariy 1970's, the percentage of the urban 
population living ln shantytowns is very high. In cities like Chimbote, 
more than 951% lived in these conditions, in Piura 50%, in Trujillo 64%, and 
-1n Lima around 30%. Only 42% of the urban population has access to 
potable water and 31% to sewage. Housing is very defficient in quantity 
and quality. Estimates of the deficit vary, but it is hardly of less than two 
million units. Data also indicates that at least 35% of the urban 
population lives in rooms lodging four or more persons. Lack of coherent 
urban policier have further aggravated the problem. Two of the problems 
stressed by experts are the dilapidation of the urban space and the 
obstacles created by a legal system that promotes speculation and 
provides little help to the poor. 
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The shantytowns gave rise to original forms of self-management. The 
military governrnent tried, during the 1970's when the rnigratory wave 
was at its peak, to controi the organizations of their dwellers but failed. 
Since the constitutional order was re-established in 1980, political 
parties have been struggling to obtain political support frorn them because 
they represent a significant proportion of the electorate. The left was the 
most successful in this endeavour but now the APRA is progressively 
gaining ground in this respect. The self-management organizations have 
been extremely successful in organizing and mobilizing trie population for 
the development of infrastructure (water, sewage, road construction, 
reforestation) and to dernand government support for these purposes. The 
process was further reinforced with the restoration of municipal 
elections and increased local governrnent autonomy in 1980. "Villa El 
Salvador", a settiement that was promoted by the military government in 
the early 1970's and that now has more than haif a million inhabitants, is 
an outstanding example of self-management organization. It contemplates 
legal and economic aspects that seek to guarantee property rights, access 
to common facilities and credit and the generation of employment 
opportunities torn the site, e pecially for wornen. The latter is very 
important, not oniy because it facilitates trie incorporation of wornen to 
the workforce, but also because in nurrrerous cases wornen are the only 
source of farnily incorne. 
Severai studies contend that the urbanization process as a- whole may be 
inevitable in Perû's long-term development. Whether this is a positive 
process or a negative one is stiil a matter of intense discussion. 
Conventional wisdom states that the concentration of population in urban 
areas is part of the development process and, after an initial phase of 
extrerne growth, it tends to stabilise, with positive effects such as 
reductions in birth rates and concentration of human resources where they 
are most productive for the nation as a whole. However, the share of 
population in urban areas wili still increase to around four-fifths of trie 
total by year 2000. This means that an ever more direct relationship will 
exist between population policy, affecting primarily urban fertility rates, 
and urban population growth, and confirms the urgency for population 
research and policy design and impiementation. 
The failure of the import substitution industrialisation in absorbing the 
labour force displaced from the rural areas deterrnined the appearance of a 
large "informal sector" in the urban areas. Only in Lima, it is estimated 
that more than 400,000 people work in informal activities. The main 
features of this "informa] sector" are that it operates outside the national 
legal system (no taxes or social security are payed) , it is largely 
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integrated, though not exclusively, by migrants, and it is a formidable 
mechanism to create job opportunities, especially in services, small 
industries and house construction. According to recent data, it is 
estimated that more than 90% of Lima's public transport system belongs 
to the informai sector, which also built 274 markets of the 331 that exist 
,in the capital city. Also, informai constructors built housing worth more 
than eight billion U.S. Dollars in the period 1960-1984, while the State 
only invested US$ 173 million. 
Several proposals are being made to incorporate the informai sector to the 
country's official legal and economic system. Two problems currently 
stressed by researchers are reforrns in the legal systern and access to 
credit. It is argued that the legal system is so entangled and 
contradictory that it forces the small entrepreneurs, the unemployed and 
even sonie of the former "format" economic activities to opt for 
informality. The costs of being "formai" are so high, because of the legal 
nightmare and civil servants' corruption, that it is cheaper to be informai. 
On the other hand, the informai financial system implies extreme1y high 
costs for those that, because they do not have "legal existence", cannot 
obtain credit from public and private banks that offer loans at rates that 
can be ten tirnes lower than the oves requested by informai lenders. 
The present debate on the informai sector has strong political 
connotations. Some contend that the State has to deregulate economic 
activities in order to grant legal access to entrepreneurs that cannot 
comply with the myriad of regulations that affect each sector, 
implementing a simple registration and tax system. Others advocate that 
the State must incôrporate the informai sector into the legal systern and 
bring it under State control, to regulate its activities and obtain tax 
payments. Both stress the need to support informai entrepreneurs through 
credit and training to increase their productivity and capacity for 
errrployment generation. 
The official acknowledgement of the problem has helped to stimulate the 
debate and to implement some interesting pilot programmes. One carried 
out by the Ministry of Labour is providing training and credit to street 
peddlers that do not have access to loans from banks because they cannot 
provide appropriate guarantees of assets. Each phase of training grants a 
higher loan that the seller has to repay in a fixed period. The programme 
has been highly successful not only in attracting interest but also in 
achieving more than 90% of repayment. 
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3.-HEALTH AND BASIC SANITATJr 
In spite of the achievements in he, - ndicators since 1940, Perû is still 
suffering severe problems In this .)r. In fart, Peruvfian indicators for 
health and sanitation are among trie -st of the région. 
Health services are concentrated 1, ban areas, especially Lima, where 
nearly half of available hospit, eds and public medical welfare 
institutions are concentrated. number of beds per thousand 
inhabitants averages 5.5 for urban 2.4 for the whole country, and 0,6 
for settlements of less than 10,(/,,' people. The average of visits to 
physicians is of four in Lima and fa'' < o 0.3 in rural areas. 
liealth policies 
The Ministry of Heaith runs a pub! ealth programme that receives an 
average of about 6% of the national et since the early 1970's (5.8% for 
M87 and a projected 6 . 3 % 4 for 1 c = Approxiiîrately 1 1 % of the total 
population is covered by the public r- .cal social-security system. 
I n the 1970's the public health pr mme was divided into 12 health 
centre service areas. The basic fut - : )n unit was the health centre Chat, 
in some cases, is part of a large ho al The outcome of this policy was 
that over 70 hospital health and another 70 centres without 
hospitals existed by the late 1970'l-, n ail, the system comprised about 
12,000, half of them in Lima, wh.. Andean departments averaged less 
than one health professional and onu I per 1,000 persons. 
Even thougt global indicators shovr : improvements, the health policies 
implemented by the military durir,; e 1970's were disastrous. As of 
1976, officiai estimates indican, 'Chat whereas 78% of the urban 
population had access to potable w,-'= supply (which was not very safe), 
only 5% of the rural population ben(, ed from the service. Most diseases 
thaï: are transmitted through inadeq;. sanitation noticéàbly lncreased. 
Pneumonia and influenza remainer, 5 the principal deathly diseases, 
followed by enteritis and diarrheal t; _ Tders. Chi1dren urrder five years of 
age accounted for half of total de;,`- -i in 1976, and infectious diseases 
continue to have a high incidence. ir, 972, the situation had deteriorated 
to the extent that 47 4 of deaths v, caused by preventable infectious 
diseases. 
With the strict economic stabilisatic - rogramme implemented during the 
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Second Phase of the rnilitary government, the situation worsened, since 
food prices increased even more than the price index as a whole, provoking 
an increase in malnutrition. A.study of iow income families showed that 
average daily calorie intake fell by 22% between 1972 and 1979 to only 
62 ô of the internationally recommended minimum level. Malnutrition hit 
the urban shanty-town areas and the rural areas al ike. 
The uneven distribution of health services is also reflected in the life 
expectancy in the different regions of the country. Lima and Callao have a 
life expectancy of 67 years, while Andean departrnents like Ayacucho, 
Puno, Huancavelica, Apurimac and Cusco, have less than 50 years. Data of 
1981 indicates that the number of households with potable water varies 
from 9% in Apurimac, Huancavelica and Puno, to 65%-71% in Lima, Tacna 
and Callao. The abandonment of vaccination programmes and health 
campaigns further aggravated the problem of infant mortality. 
While per capita investment in water supply and sanitation has been 
extremely low, among the lowest in the region, the extremely unfavourable 
resuits are compounded by the fact that efficiency is also low resulting in 
bad quality and poor coverage of services. Most water systems of the 
country suffer considerable losses owing to leakage and illegal 
connections. Besides, inadequate design standards contribute to the high 
per capita investment cost which in urban areas is four times higher than 
in rural areas. 
Health research 
Health research is carried out by both public and non governmental 
institutions. Public hospitals and universities investigate specific 
problems but littie coordination appears to exist between them, among 
other factors because of the extreme inefficiency of the Ministry of 
Health. Private centres and universities, like the "Alexander von 
Humboldt' and the Universidad Cayetano Heredia, develop independent 
research and provide health services to the poor. Water and sanitation 
problems are also investigated by these institutions, but the presence of 
the PAHO dependent "Centro Panamericano de Ingenieria Sanitaria" (CEPIS) 
in Lima determines a heavy influence of this organization in this field. 
Research topics in these area are numerous. Among them, nutritional 
programmes targeted to the extremely poor, strategies to increase the 
coverage of health services, especially in rural areas, control of 
infectious diseases, and strategles to improve the efficiency, better use 
and coverage of water and sewerage systems are indispensable and urgent. 
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4.-ÉDUCATION 
In Perù education was one of thé few ways of social mobility for the 
relatively disadvantaged. But schools were scarce outside cities, 
instruction was confined to Spanish, exciuding vast portions of the native 
quechua and aymara speakers. Absenteeism of both teachers and students 
in the rural areas was high and the dropout extremely high. 
In spite of the expansion in the State educational budget during the 1960's, 
more than a quarter of the Peruvian chiidren never entered a primary 
school in 1971, while only a third started secondary education and few of 
them ever completed it. That same year, one third of the aduit population 
was sti i l i l l i terate. Of these two million i l l i terates, 70% were women, 
most of them from the rural areas. 
Exclusion from the educational system meant lower status, income and 
employment opportunities. On the contrary, access to university almost 
quaranteed entrance into the civil service, teaching or a weil-payed 
independent professional practice. The proportion of the poor population 
that bas been able to undertake and finish formai schooling has always 
been really small, since approximately 12% of those who begin primary 
school actually finish secondary education. However, the importance of 
education for ail sectors of the population is immense. For instance, a 
millt.ary government decree in 1968 that limited f ree access to secondary 
education precipitated strikes and uprisings in the Andes, until the 
military repelled the decree. 
Educational reform 
If migration and land reform had a significant impact on Peruvian society, 
the educational reform of the milltary had a much more ambiguous one. 
The reform planned to reorganise education along participatory fines, with 
the involvement of factories, community organizations, students, parents 
and local authorities. Literacy, preserving cultural values and stressing 
cultural heritage, was a priority, together with programmes of non formai 
education for aduits aimed at professional qualification. Also, the 
reformers tried to adapt school texts to the realities of underdevelopment 
at al] levels, seeking to stress the relationship between education and 
work. Books were distributed free in poor areas, 
However, the reform was unable to transform the Peruvian educational 
system in any positive sense. The main problem that reformers faced was 
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opposition on three fronts: the State bureacracy that was unsympathetic 
or sirnply indifferent to the reforrn; the middle clans that felt trie 
educational aspirations for their children threatened, and the teachers 
who, groûped in a powerful union, labelled the military government as 
"fascist" under the influence of their Maoist leadership. The cooperation 
of teachers in the reform became impossible alter a strike in 1973 that 
ended with the arrest of 400 teachers and a government refusai to 
recognise the legal existence of the union (known as SUTEP). 
For these reasons, the reform only achieved incompletely some of its goals 
but the main ones were never attained. The Peruvian formai education 
system continues to be stratified along socio-cultural lines forrning a 
complex of several interrelated systems that are not, and do not intend to 
be, equai or designed to reward individual merit. According to a recent 
document of the National Planning Institute, 90% of the total educational 
system is supported by the State, but its quality is extremely poor. In 
1987, 180(20 of the national budget was devoted to education. 
Formai education continues to be poorly articulated with the needs of the 
productive sectors and its quality is continuousiy deteriorating. The 
response to the need for practicai training has been the development of a 
number of informai programmes and "technical schools" that offer training 
of very dubious quality. Private enterprises have pooled to organise more 
serious apprentice and training programmes to up-grade the work skills 
for specific industries. The government estimates that about onlyl0% of 
the workforce has some sort of technical training. 
The situation of universities 
Universities had a rapid expansion during the last 25 years. Between 1950 
and 1959 only one university was established, but in 1960 alone nine were 
created. In the following decade, 22 more universities were founded and 
the number of students tripled from about 30,000 in 1960 to 109,320 in 
1970. Four new universities were established between 1970 and 1980. 
However, the number of students more than doubied in the saine period 
overcrowding existing acadernic institutions. - In 1980, students surpass 
the quarter of a million and reach the figure of 350,000 irr 42 universities 
in 1984. However, according to officiai data, only 11 out of every 100 
students that enter school have access to university. 
This explosive growth in the number of students was not matched by staff 
or budgetary increases. The subsequent deterioration in the quality of 
education has been dramatic, particularly in public universities. In fact, 
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prior to 1970 the best and more prestigious universities were the public 
ones, while during the 1970's the situation became exactly the opposite. in 
1984, the northern region of the country had seven universities, 
metropolitan L'irna 16, the central Andean region seven, the south nine, and 
the Amazon region three. According to data of 1980, 40% of the registered 
students in Lima were migrants from other regions of the country, and 
accounted for more than 55% of total students in the country. 
Between 1975 and 1984 social sciences students averaged 31.5% of the total, while engineering accounted for 22.49 and law, humanities and the arts for 14.3%. Health sciences and education only account for 97o of the 
total number of students in the saine period, followed by a 6% in the agricultural sciences, which lost popularity after the 1969 agrarian 
reform. Natural and exact sciences only averaged 5%. 
Education research 
Research on education is done in the public sector mainly by the "Instituto 
Nacional de Investigation y Desarrol lo de la - Educacion" (1NIDE), which 
received strong support during the educational reform, but n'ow is reduced 
and depends on a very tight budget. Several non governmental 
organizations carry out research on education topics, including rural 
éducation. 
The latter is one of. -the priorities of thé présent: administration. The 
problem is coiliple saine thé G%-,of.the':national budget-.that.is âllocated to; education is tb. rrâirtain ëxisting1_"sèrvi_cés,2; let alone 
additional coverage. A recent study`showed that' hall of thé scliools have only one teacher for ail grades, and that 65% of the Andean and 8019 â of the Amazon region teachers do not even have an educational degree. Indicators 
of absenteeism are also dramatic: from a 3,444,554 population between 
15 and 24 years old, only 554,000 had completed primary school; two thirds of the rural labour force had not completed primary education; and, 
only 4% of the total rural population had sonie degree of secondary 
éducation while less than 27o had some technicai or superior training. Besides, the 1981 census indicates that more than 65% of the rural population is illiterate, with the Andean departments showing the worst indicators, especially with respect to the female population. 
Curiously enough, the teachers' union (SUTEP), that during the military 
government attacked the reform, is now re-evaluating its objectives and is discussing ways of implementing popular éducation programmes. Some universities and several international coopération agencies are active in 
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supporting these efforts, including programmes in peasant comrnunities, 
probably the rnost neglected portion of the population in education 
services. 
5.- AGRICULTURE ,FORESTRY AND FISHING 
The availability of agricultural land in Perû is very limited. Out of the 
country's land area of 128.5 million hectares, about 400% is not suitable for 
any agricultural use, 40% is only suited for forestry, and another 15% is 
best suited for pastures. This leaves only a 5% that can be used for crops. 
Most of the best soifs of the country, adequate for extensive agriculture, 
(around 3% of the territory) are already under cultivation. Agriculture on 
the coast is concentrated in small irrigated areas, using relatively 
advanced technologies. The Andes accounts for well over half of the 
arable land but, except for few valleys with permanent streams, 
agricultural development is difficult. Deforestation and rapid erosion 
have further aggravated the problem. Land in the tropical forests has 
llmit.ed potential for agricultural activities, escept for some areas of the 
low eastern Andes. The soifs have low natural fertility levels and under 
the heavy rainfali, only last for a single season before accelerated 
deterioration turns them into arid plots. 
According to the 1972 agricultural census, arable cropland amounted to 
3.3 million hectares; an additional nearly 550,000 hectares were used for 
perennial crops, cultivated pastures and a small amount of cultivated 
forest. The area harvested that same year was 1.9 million hectares with 
more than one-third of the cropland left fallow. 
Perû has abundant water resources but the division imposed by the Andes 
creates a highly unbalanced location that largely favours the Amazon 
basin. Between the Andes and the Pacific Ocean flow about fifty rivers 
but mort of thern are seasonal streams that swell in the summer months 
to 10-20 times their minimum flows. They provide most of the water 
used for agriculture and urban domestic use in coastal cities. 
Peruvian agriculture is heavily dependent on irrigation and around 1.5 
million hectares are currently being irrigated. Three-quarters of these 
irrigated lands are located in the coast and the rest in the Andes. For 
decades, investment has concentrated on new irrigation works but little 
has been devoted to rehabilitation, adequate operation and maintenance of 
existing facilities. The results are that the irrigation systems are falling 
Into decay . Besides, over 250,000 hectares of arable land are being 
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affected by salinity and water logging because of lack of drainage, design 
problems and inadequate water management. 
In quantity terms, Perû's water resources appear to be adequate to cover 
agricultural and urban dornestic requirements in the long-term, but their 
utilisation will require substantial investments, especially to transfer 
water from the eastern slopes of the Andes to the coast. 
The importance of agriculture in the Peruvian economy has varied 
throughout history. In pre-colonial times agriculture in trie Andes was trie 
principal econoric activity. In the colonial and the republican periods, the 
importance of agriculture has fluctuated inversely with the boom-boost 
cycles of other sectors of the econorny, rnainly mining, Since the early 
1950's, aggregate output has been low, per capital rural incomes have at 
best stagnated and the dependence on imported foodstuffs increased. 
Having the worst land distribution ratio of the continent (40 Fo of the 
producers beld less than 2% of the land) it is not surprising that the sector 
was affected by increasing peasant unrest for a long tirne. The pressure 
substantially intensified in the late 1950's and during the 1960's. In June, 
1969 the military government approved a radical Land Reform Law that 
changed Perû's landownership patterns. Latifundist agriculture was 
liquidated and the property rights transferred to agricultural workers, 
small farmers and peasant communities. 
The 1969 land reform 
Flot surprisingly, land reform did not put an end to discontent in the 
countryside. Even though some 430,000 familles somehow benefitted from 
it, they represent between about 25% of total rural population. Among 
them the main beneficiaries were previous permanent wageworkers turned 
into coopérative members and ex-tenants that held part-time jobs but 
were in possesion of a small plot of land for which they had to pay rent 
before the reform. The rest, landless peasants or very poor rninifh c75'tas, 
who represent about 30% of the country's population, were excluded from 
its benefits. With poor and small plots of land and little or no government 
assistance, small farmers depend on off farm employment to finance a 
significant amount of their family expenditures. The impact of the reform 
on employment has been poor, since the coopérative members retained 
their jobs but little new opportunities for landless peasants were created. 
Also, since the redistribution of income and resources was within 
agriculture, rather than a net transfer of resources from other economic 
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activities, lts beneflts were lirnited by the average low productlvlty of 
the sector. Different studies have estimated that the redistribution of 
the land reform affected only 6-10% of rural income, i.e. 1.5-29 of 
national income. 
Macroeconomic policies ln general and pricing policies in particular 
seriously attempted against agricultural development. Price subsidies on 
imported foodstuffs benefitted the urban rich portion of the population and 
discouraged domestic food production. Price subsidies on fertilizers 
favoured the mort prosperous producers and resulted in many cases in 
inefficient use of this input. Overvalued local currency desincentivated 
exports and induced coast producers to compete with less efficient Andean 
farmers. Ever increasing government controls on marketing, coupled with 
litt.le investment in storage facilities, discouraged private investment in 
food marketing activities. 
In spite of recent improvements, production data on the agricultural 
sector are not very reliable. The trends that can be identified from 
existing information Indicate that since the early 1960's aggregate output 
has been much lower than in the 1950's and has not kept pace with 
population growth. The rate of growth of the sector for 25 years has been 
of 2% per annum and the share of agriculture in total GNP has fallen from 
'215% in the early 1950's to around 10-12 ,Po in the last years. During the 
period 1970-1976, immediately alter the reform, agricultural production 
grew at a yearly average rate of 0.99, while the Peruvian economy's 
growth rate was 5% per annum. 
However, recent research has demonstrated that the output of some 
products grew dramatically while production of others stagnated. For 
Instance, the development of the poultry industry (179 per annum between 
1969 and 1977), that took place near urban areas and had nothing to do 
with the agrarian reform, allowed the above-mentioned growth rate of 
0.9%, that otherwise would have been negative. In general terms, the 
products that registered a continuous increase were of direct urban 
consomption or for agroindustrial purposes, while export and 
self-consumption products decreased or simply stagnated. In regional 
terms, this means that agriculture in the coast adaptes to new market 
conditions, while trie Andean hacieno'a and subsistence agriculture 
stagnated. 
Animal production 
The riumber of cattle was officiaily estimated at four million in 1986, 
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which rneans that production has stagnated for at least a decade. The 
number of pigs was estimated at two million, up only 6.2% in 15 years. 
The number of sheep was estimated at 14 million, up 10% on the 1984 low 
point but 17% lower than in 1971. As for chickens, estimates are of 48 
million in 1986, which is 97% higher than the 1971 figure, but represents 
a drop of 18.6% from the 1983 peak. The number of alpacas is estimated in 
2.5 million, while Manias amount to two million. 
Cajamarca is the most important beef production region, followed by Puno, 
Ayacucho, Apurirnac, and Cusco. Sheep is mainly raised in Puno and the 
central Andes. About half of the pig stock is in trie central Andes, while 
the northern and southern reglons equally share the balance. Puno is the 
main producer of llamas and alpacas, while goats are produced in Piura, 
Ayacucho, Lima and Huancavelica. Chicken is an industry concentrated 
near coastal cities. 
Agrieultural research 
The evolution of agricultural research in the public sector is complicated 
and reflects the changes that affected agriculture, especially during the 
period 1969-1975. The Integration of the "instituto de Reforma y 
Promoclôn Agraria" (IRPA) into the Ministry of Agriculture in 1969 and the 
subsequent transference of extension staff to agrarian reform 
assignments, interrupted a 26-year experience of agricultural extension in 
the country. Various experiments during the 1970's were not efficient in 
achieving the objectives of providing adequate technical assistance to the 
producer. 
The establishment of the "instituto Nacional de Investigaciôn Agraria" 
(INIA) In 1979 with responsibility for practically ail aspects of research 
and extension work, marked a fresh start in this respect. Re-named as 
"instituto Nacional de Investigaclôn y Promoclôn Agropecuaria" (INIPA) in 
the early 1980's, and with a more decentralised structure, the Institute 
made efforts. to promote research deai-ing with production problems at the 
local level, and tried to carry out more research and promotion activities 
aimed at the traditionally neglected small producers of the Andes. The 
mort important of these activities is the joint IDRC--CIDA project on 
Andean farming systems in the Puno region. Recently re-named once again 
as "Instituto de Investigaclones Agropecuarias y Agroindustrlales" 
(INIAA), the institution is currently going through a reorganization 
process. 
Agricultural technical research is a1so done in Universities, botte in Lima, 
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like the Universidad Nacional Agraria (UNA), and in the provinces, like the 
Universidad Nacional San Agustin (UNSA) in Arequipa and the Universidad 
del Altiplano in Puno. Several non-governrnental organizations carry out 
research on rural subjects from the social sciences perspective, on 
subjects like migration, employment, evolution of peasant communities, 
impact of macroeconomic policies on the agricultural sector, etc. Also, 
non-governmental action-research groups are very active, especially in 
trie Andean region, working at the community level. 
Agriculture in the coast 
The toast has concentrated almost ail of the modern and dynamic 
activities of Peruvian agriculture, but provides employment to a very 
small share of the rural population. This region not only benefitted from 
the best lands but also from the pro-export bias of several governments 
and from foreign capital investments. For instance, between 1950 and 
1978, 90% of total public investment on irrigation was concentrated in the 
toast. 
Large coastal estates transformed into modern agriculturai complexes 
that produced ail the sugar, two thirds of the cotton one-third of the rite, 
one-fourth of the maize and half of citrus fruits. During the 1960's heavy 
invest.rrient in mechanization drastically cut 
employment, and by 1967 they 
employed oniy 65,000 permanent and part-time wage-workers. 
The 1969 Agrarian reform transformed these large complexes into 
cooperatives. Assuming their roles of part ownership, members of the 
cooperatives were often more interested in maximizing immediate returns 
than in the enterprise's longer-term viability through investment policies. 
In some instances, enterprises were overloaded with members who were 
primarily interested in membership rather than in working to achieve 
becter output and other common goals of the association. Initially, 
technicians and experienced managers were urged to remain in their posts, 
and this to increase production. However, rising conflicts between 
managers and cooperative members, forced the former to resign and 
production rapidly declined. Poor planning, lack of round technical advice, 
decapitalisation, financial mismanagement, and deterioration of 
equipment, deterrnined a severe crisis in the activity. Incoherent 
government tax and pricing policies aggravated the situation. 
Andean agricultural development 
Oevelopments In the Andes were radicaily différent. Andean agriculture 
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stagnated for centuries, forgotten by governrnents that lrnposed adverse 
pricing policies and little public investment for infrastructure. Thus, vast 
areas of this region remained isolated and with a minimal supply of public 
services. 
By . 1967, around 40% of the Andes farmlands were huge haciendas 
managed through tenancy arrangements. They usually had the best 
pastures but not the best croplands, that were in the hands of medium and 
small farmers. Primitive technologies, low productivity and small capital 
investments were the main features of the haciendas Labour was 
basically provided by tenants who farmed small plots of the hacienda in 
exchange for cent, a share of the crops or a provision of free labour. The 
bulk of these large landholdings underutilised their resources, but at the 
came time the variations in quality of ]and and microclimates within the 
sarne estate made it difficult a more efficient management than through 
the system of small farmers. The few haciendas that did modernize 
moved from the traditional tenancy system to extensive sheep production, 
the only way to achieve economies of scale. 
Medium-sized farms accounted for around 6% of Andes farmland in 1967. 
Their contribution to total output was larger but still lacked any major 
national significance. The quality of ]and, the technology used and the 
output per unit were below the coastal medium-sized farms. 
Small farms accounted for the balance. These included ]and owned by 
"peasant communities", mostly devoted to subsistence agriculture which 
produced a negligible marketable surplus. These familles, called 
minifundistas, together with the landless peasants, were the poorest 
strata of the rural sector. 
There are about 3,500 peasant communities in Perû, with a population of 
500,000 familles. From a macro-economic point of view, these poor 
communal organizations are the oves that contribute less to the GDP 
considering the amount of workers involved. One of the main problems of 
most of the communities is that the ]and, livestock and water resources 
are not sufficient to maintain the reproduction of the familles belonging 
to the community. Many of their members complemer't their farming 
activities with salary income as workers, domestic servants or 
harvesters. 
rart of trie communal lands are individual property, mostly croplands, 
while pastures generally belong to the community as a whole. This 
determines a dual structure in which individual and communal property 
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coexist but, most important of ail, determine a social organization in 
which joint effort allows the community to survive in an extremely 
difficult environment. For unexplained historical reasons land is unevenly 
distributed among community members. The inequalities have became 
more marked in recent years, particularly in the communities more 
integrated to the market economy, 
The 1969 agrarian reform tried to rnaintain the unity of the former 
haciendas, in large cooperatives called "Agrarian Societies of Social 
Interest" (SAIS), and at the same time to improve the incomes and living 
conditions of the communities. In a SAIS, the expropriated estate is 
farrned by the ex-workers and ex-tenants, but ownership, management and 
profits are shared with nome of the peasant communities surrounding the 
estate, Most of the SAIS have been established around former livestock 
hac/cn/s in the Andes. 
With relatively few exceptions, the results of the SAIS experience have 
been rather poor. Lack of credit and technical support, as well as 
difficulties in incorporating the peasant communities to the large 
production units, have hampered the achievement of original goals. 
Peasant communities have repeatedly claimed that the agrarian reform 
failed to relieve the plight of the small producers. 
Developing programmes aimed at the rural poverty question in Peri is 
dlf.flcult for several reasons. In addition to the limitationsimposed by the 
resource base , the primitive technology, illiteracy, lack of infrastructure, 
cultural barriers and physical isolation, the rural poor have had many 
contacts with the 'modern sector" that have proved disadvantageous to 
them. This situation have made them highly skeptical, and in some cases 
overtly hostile, to outside induced programmes. Besides, while the 
experience with large programmes is very limited, micro-experiences, 
rainly by private groups, provide useful insights but their dependence on 
large foreign inputs made them difficult to replicate on a bigger scale. 
institutional arrangements and coordination are a serious bottleneck too. 
Traditionally, government agencies have worked independently, with little 
or no coordination, and through the classic research approach of the 
experimental station. Efforts to link different government agencies have 
had some success in Puno, Cajamarca and Cuzco, and in some cases 
non-governmental organizations have also participated in joint 
development programmes. However, there is still ample room for 
improvement. 
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To be successful, Andean developrnent programmes have to involve trie 
ultirriate berneficiaries in the setting of priorities, the design and the 
implernentation. They afro have to be accompanied by significant 
increases in credit, marketing facilitiés and a reasonable macroeconomic 
polir_y, Chat favours domestic production. But rnost important of ail, rince 
the objective of these programmes is to improve the living conditions of 
th.e small farmers, they have to carefully assess the impact of technology 
application on their income in the short, medium and long-run. In many 
projects that established such an objective, the final outcome has been 
trie loss of competitivity of marginal smail farmers, the poorer strata of 
the population, and a significant increase in production that lowered 
prices favouring the urban consumer. In other cases, the probiem of 
marketing of the increased surplus was only contemplated when 
production had already improved, and not from the very beginning d trie 
programme, with the subsequent fosses for the producer. 
Forestry and agricultural developmen 
Forestry research is a vital cornpiement for crops and animal production 
projects and programmes. Three main critical areas have been identified 
in this respect: The vole of trees in agro-forestry systems for vertient 
recycling, shade and shelter, forrage production and income generation (i.e. 
fruit trees), reforestation to replenish stock because of intensive use of 
fuelwood, and rational exploitation of tropical forests. 
Reforestation in the coast 
The negative effects of deforestation on agricultural production, like 
farmiand erosion, are well known. This problem is currently affecting 
agriculture both in the coast and the Andes, where tree felling is 
accelerating the deterioration of agricultural land and pastures. In the 
toast, the original savannah-type, open woodlands of trie northern part, 
largely composed by prosopis species, have been almost completely 
destroyed to meet local demands for animal fodder, fuelwood, fence posts 
and building potes. The destruction has been further aggravated by the 
depredation of goats, on which trie poorest strata of the comrnunity depend 
for subsistence. 
To re-establish these vital woods on sites of marginal agricultural value 
in trie arid toast, artificial irrigation is needed in the first years 
after planting. Such irrigation is feasible only if agricultural drainage and 
waste water are used. Research is currently focused on the determination 
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of the minimum requirements for tree establishment, and tolerance of 
appropriate species and varieties to semi-saline irrigation water, and 
their productivity. 
In the southern part of the coastal lowlands, also extremely arid, naturai 
vegetation is even sparser. Since it plays an important role in the rural 
economy as an emergency source of animal feed for the migratory pastoral 
community, woodlands have been destroyed causing severe erosion. 
Research is currently focused on the potentiai use of humidity 
concentration in the area during the three or four winter months, through 
the utilisation of simple, locally made interceptors that can provoke 
'ough precipitation to support afforestation programmes. 
T e critical situation of the Andes 
Total wood requirements are expected to increase by 1.5 million cubic 
metres by the year 2000. Fuelwood supply and demand would be on balance 
that year if about haif of the unidentified sources are stiii available and if 
ail planned projects are adequately f inanced and impiemented. Under these 
assumptions, existing plantations would provide 19 fo of total wood 
requirements; on-going projects would account for 11 %, and less firm 
supplies, such as "unidentified sources", which are only inferred, would 
cover the balance of 70% of demand. This clearly indicates the urgency 
ofobtaining more accurate data on the "unidentified resources", as soon as 
possible and to finance and irliplement existing and potential projects. 
A bleak prospect awaits the country if this unidentified resource is 
depleted more rapidly or turns out to be non viable. A 1983 study 
estimated that if only 10-127o of this resorce remains, there avili be a 
deficit of almost two million cubic metres in year 2000, which can be met 
only by accelerating reforestation efforts to cover an additional 19,000 
hectare/year beyond the 30,000 hectare/year covered under planned 
projects, and if no more than sustainable yieids are extracted. 
Government agencies are emphasizing the need to investigate better 
reforestation techniques and assessment of future demand and supply, 
since if planned projects are delayed, fail or are not undertaken, the 
fuelwood situation would soon transform into a deep crisis, Besides, the 
outlook would be further desertification, erosion and accelerated 
depletion of remaining stock. 
This situation reaches critical proportions in the Andes, especially in 
certain areas. The bulk of reforestation has been concentrated in f ive out 
of 24 departments (Cusco, Junin, Apurimac, Ancash and Cajamarca), these 
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accounting for 73% of trie total reforested area. However, these 
concentration of efforts was seriously questioned, since places litre Puno 
in the Andes and Plura in the northern coast and Andes, are areas of rapid 
wood outtake and facing severe pénuries in the medium term. In fact, Puno 
was lncluded in the biggest reforestation project that started in 1982 and 
is to be completed in 1987. 
According to a 1983 report, external aid bas focussed mostly on 
reforestation in the most favourable areas of the Andes and on supporting 
forent industries ln the humid forests of the Amazon, while little is being 
done on erosion control and watershed management. The largest project 
was supported by FAO, with funding of about US$ 5 million from The 
Netherlands government. The reforestation project is for energy purposes 
and initially covered 13,000 hectares/year with a target of gradually 
building up to 30,000 hectares/year. Implementation started in Huancayo, 
Huaraz and Puno. 
Around ten million hectares are suitable for reforestation in Perù, 7.5 of 
which are located in the Andes. The above-mentioned FAO project would 
only cover, if results are optimal, 7%0 of the total amount suitable for 
reforestation in the Andes. Government promotion of private tree-planting 
is needed, especially in those rural areas where the activity can become 
income-ger,erating through commercialization for bouse building and 
household use. Also, an increase in the project implementation capacity is 
required to develop more and better projects. 
The Amazon region 
This region covers about 60% of the Peruvian territory and contains over 
20 n of the country'- total cultivated area. It can be divided in two main 
regions: the High Forests that cover the eastern foothills of the Andes and 
is characterized by hilly terrain, wide valleys and winding rivers, and the 
Low Amazon Forests that is almost entirely covered by humid tropical 
forests and accounts for 87% of Perû's total woodlands. Both the High and 
the Low forests' timber resources have been extensively exploitéd. 
Deforestation is currently occurring at an average of 100,000 hectares of 
woods per year for both timber production and agricultural purposes. Of 
the approximately six million hectares of forest cleared for agriculture in 
t.he Peruvian Amazon during trie last 50 years, scarcely 1.3 million are 
cuitlvated, because the low fertility of the soit necessitates a typical 
process of shifting cultivation. The remainder is covered by secondary 
forest left to renew soil fertility during fallow periods of ten to 20 years 
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and is of no direct benefit to the colonizing farmer. This system of 
shifting cultivation rnakes the soit susceptible to compacting and erosion. 
Therefore, one of the research priorities in this area is the utilization of 
environmentally sound approaches for further agricultural development. 
Trees can play a very important role in implementing systerns that seek to 
replace the shifting cultivation practices, that cannot support the 
pressure of increasing colonization. More specifically, fruit trees can 
represent a particularly valuable component in such systems, rince they 
can offer a relatively rapid source of additional income to the small 
fariner, as well as improving his family's nutritional standards. The 
Peruvian Amazon region contains some 150 species of native fruit trees, 
but lack of knowledge about their requirements, management , and 
production potential has hampered any serious effort to cultivate them on 
a large scale. The government institution INIPA (now INIAA), has selected 
four species to incorporate them in this attempt to develop ecologically 
sound cropping systerns. 
In spite of efforts to develop agroforestry systems which will allow the 
shortening of fallow periods, or even eliminate them by continuous 
cropping, there stili will remain enormous areas where the mort 
appropriate alternative in the foreseeable future will be sonie utilisation 
of the fallow forests, which at present are not used. Projects are now 
being developed in this area (with IDRC support) to study the rote of these 
rapidly-growing fallow forests in recovering soi] fertility and the 
possibilities of exploiting them, through wood production, in the benefit of 
the poorest settlers, but without interrupting the soi] recovery process. 
However, the research problems in the tropical forests are not limited to 
agricultural development. Logging operations have neither been carefully 
assessed, nor adequately controlled. Forestry regulations in Perû require 
that extractors plant two trees for every cubic metre of wood obtained, 
but they are not enforced, are normally lgnored by extractors, or simply 
there are no clear indications as to how and where planting should be done. 
Therefore, priorities in this area include studies about systems to control 
of logging operations, a strategy for the protection of over-exploited 
areas and the establishment of national parks for wildlife preservation. 
F1 hin 
Fishing in Perû has been a constant activity throughout history. Ceramics 
of pre-inca civilizations show that fish was the main animal protein in 
the coast and a nutritional complement in the Andes. The cold Humboldt 
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Current rnakes Perû's marine protein resources one of trie richest in trie 
world, and the country's second major resource asset, after mining, 
However, its real potential is still being assessed and its ecological 
determinants are not fully understood. This makes the industry highly 
vulnerable to ecological changes, especially to the warm currents that 
periodically turn south from the Equator and alter the balance of especies, 
disrupting production. Research is being done in this field but the danger 
of changing ecological conditions and/or overfishing remains large. 
Until World War il fishing was confined to small boats and was limited to 
coastal markets, except for a fish-canning industry that flourished during 
the war, mainly for export to the United States. Tuna fishing and canning 
was the main activity during the second half of the 1940's and early 
1950's but protectionist policies implemented by the United States 
determined that from the 69 factories operating in 1953, only five still 
survived by the early 1960's. 
During the second hall of trie 1950's the production of fishmeal and fish oi1 
from anchovy triggered what has been called the "fishing boom Initially 
there were only a few factories and these were rather small. By the early 
19CA's there were more Chan 160 factories and a whole city, Chimbote, 
emerged as a huge shanty-town as thousands of Andean migrants arrived 
looking for employment and income opportunities. 
The mort rapid growth of the industry took place between 1958 and 1964. 
This growth was so impressive that Perù moved from an unimportant 28th 
position in world production in 1955, to the first place in production and 
exports in less than six years. The catch stabilized in subsequent years at 
about ten million tons. Most of it went was processed to produce fishmeal 
and a by-product, fish oil. initially, the industry was owned by Peruvian 
entrepreneurs, but during the 1960's foreign capital progressively 
acquired the assets until it became predominant. Almost ail of the output 
was exported as nutrients for animal food. The-benefits for the economy, 
though unevenly distributed, were impressive in terms of diversification 
of exports, foreign exchange earnings and employment generation. 
However, by the early 1970's the "fishing boom" had corne to an end. it is 
not clear whether massive fishing upset ecological balance, if changes in 
the Humboldt current determined a dramatic reduction of anchovy, or if 
both caused the depletion of the species. Besides, international markets 
were not absorbing Peruvian output as in previous years and stocks began 
to accumulate. In 1973, the industry suffered a deep crisis and the 
government expropriated the whole industry, including the f leet, 
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infrastructure and processing facillties. As a result the giant public 
corporation PESCAPERU was established as the biggest fishing enterprise 
in the world, In the late 1970's during the Second Phase of the military 
government and in the early 1980's the constitutional government of 
Fernando Belaûnde proceeded to re-privatize the industry, especially for 
human consumption. 
In spite of the decay of the fishmeal industry, the fishing sector offers 
the following advantages: it is labour intensive, it provides nutritive 
animal protein, it provides foreign exchange, and it has developed 
important backward linkages with the rest of the economy. 
In terms of the fishing sector capacity to generate employment, the 
number of workers operating the fleet in 1968-1969 was estimat.ed at 
about 18)000 stable fishermen, and between 5,000 and 10,000 occasional 
(ishermen. Fishing also had a significant income generation impact in 
creat.ing additional employment in activities like manufacturing of fishing 
gear, ice manufacture, storage facilities, etc, Currently more than 
600,000 people depend directly or indirectly on fishing activities. 
One of the most important changes in the sector after the boom is the 
significant growth of fishing for human consumption. One of the measures 
taken to increase supply were the so-called "joint fishing agreernents" 
with the Polish enterprise RYBEX and the Cuban FLOCUBA. The contracta 
were based on an original formula that allowed the foreign enterprises to 
pay t.he concession rights in fish for human consumption. Agreements 
were reached with the Soviet Union's SOVRYBFLOT for the same purpose. 
However, political pressure, based on accusations of depredation, have 
made the activity of the trawlers extremely erratic, and have been now 
cancelled, with the only exception of Cuba. 
Per capita consumption of fish increased from 9.8 kg. n 1970 to 14.3 kg, in 
1986. From that total, 11.3 kg. are fresh fish, 1.2 kg, canned products, and 
0.8 kg, dry salted ones. Currently, fish accounts for 35% of total meat 
consumption in the country. 
In 1981 the sector contributed only I fo of total GDP and since thon has 
further reduced to 0,7% in 1985, in spite of a 2.4% growth in that year. 
However, anchovy is reappearing and the production of fishmeal registered 
a moderate increase in 1985 and a more significant one in 1986. Output for 
human consumption decreased in 1985 and 1986 with respect to 1984. In 
Tact, the appearance of the warm Nirio current seriously affected the 
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industry in 1983 and 1986, and trie first half of 1987 when production 
registered a sharp decline. 
Fishing research and institutiona dkyelo m %nt 
In spite of the potential of and the great achievements in this economic 
activity, several problems are currently affecting its development. One of 
the main and more dangerous difficulties is trie lack of resources and 
institutional power of the "Instituto de] Mar del Perû", (IMARPE) to assess 
existing marine biornass and control the catch. Another obstacles are the 
obsolete fishing fleet (95% is 15-22 years old); an inadequate structure 
of trie industrial processing by which the private sector has a flexibility 
to switch from fishmeai to canned foo products according to market 
conditions, while the State-owned PESCAPERU only produces fishmeal; 
and, adverse investment and export conditions (e.g. disadvantageous 
exchange rate). 
IMARPE was created to study, regulate and monitor the fishing activities. 
However, IMARPE's activities have limited to investigate the 
oceanographic, biological, economic, and technical aspects of marine 
resources. The importance attached to fishing by the military gover rament 
led to the creation of the Ministry of Fisheries in 1969, which also had its 
ovin research body. W'hen the Ministry was created, IMARPE becsrre a 
decentralised body with a network of fish culture stations in several 
places, including trie Amazon port of Iquitos. 
Investigations at IMARPE have raised the issue of overfishing and 
determined periodic prohibitions to prevent depredation. Since 1970, 
IMARPE has developed research on species for human consumption, since 
prevlously it was almost exciusively devoted to, the study of anchovy. 
More recently, IMARPE has assigned a high research priority to the 
rialysis of the change in currents that determine drastic ecological 
changes that aise affect agriculture. 
The "Instituto Tecnolbgico Pesquero" (ITP) set up in 1978 is another public 
body which conducts research related to the processing of hydrobiological 
products of the sea and continental waters. ITP received substantial 
support from the Japanese agency JICA. The "Centro de Transformaciôn 
Pesquera" (CTP) is the operating unit of ITP, that devotes to improve 
f ishing techniques and to elaborate r iew products of higri nutritional value 
aind low cost. CTP aise conducts research on working conditions, health 
and safety systems and production problems. 
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Both IMARPE and ITP have faced a series of problems since their 
establishment. Currently, they suffer from a very tight budget and 
financial insecurity is causing a loss of human resources and difficulties 
in carrying out projects. 
Seven universities, out of a total of 33, grant degrees in fisheries 
engineering. There are other six that offer training in marine biology or 
give incidentai courses on the subject. There is little or no 
coordinationbetween these educational centres and the government 
research and development institutions. 
6.--INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Perù has several assets on which to build a dynamic and efficient 
ssector. The main assets are: the actual and latent skills of the 
Peruvian workers, the natural resource endowrnent, and its geographic 
location as member of the Pacific basin. 
Many Peruvian workers have sophisticated skills in textile and clothing 
production, metal-working and other light consumer industries that have 
slowly buiit up for centuries. The potential of these industries also 
benef its f rom national natural resources, such as metal products, f ish and 
seafood, cotton fibres and top-quality wool, andprecious woods. 
HOWever, Perds industrial prospects are sorrlber because varlous factors 
crontt.rain rapid industrialization. In the first place, Perd has a small 
domestic market for industrial products, due to the its skewed income 
distribution and the vast portion of the population that still lives outside 
the modern economy. Protectionist policies that have rewarded 
inefficiency in terms of quality and production costs, has impeded the 
development of dynamic export industrial activities, with few exceptions. 
The lack of capacity, and incentives, to gain access to external markets, 
has condemned the lndustry to depend on subsidies from other sectors and 
excessive protectionism, making it extremely vuinerable to government 
policies and unviable in the long run. 
Import substitution industrialisation 
Litre many other Latin American countries, Perd accelerated its industrial 
growth alter World War H. The strategy was oriented to import 
substitution and the basic tools were also similar to other regional 
countries: high tariff and non-tariff barriers, generous government 
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financial incentives, tax exemptions, and support for infrastructural 
development. The first law of this kind was the Industrial Promotion Law 
of 1959, during the second government of Manuel Prado. This legal 
provision was' remarkable for its generosity to domestic and foreign 
capital and total absence of selectivity with respect to activities, since 
ail branches of industry would receive incentives. 
Throughout the 1960's import substitution industries flourished rnainly 
because of high profitability rates. Massive foreign investment in the 
period did not only opened new industries but took over important 
activities. Between 1960 and 1966 freign investment in the 
manufacturing sector trebled. However, rnost of the industries that 
developed during the period were heavily dependent on imported inputs, 
litre the vehicle assembling plants, and progressively increased pressure 
on the balance of payments. 
The military implemented a new industrial development strategy and 
forrnali _ed it in the General Law of Industries of 1970. Emphasis was 
placed on "autonomous and self-sustained growth" in order to reduce the 
country's economic subordination to the vagaries of the international 
ri1arket. The law introduced a selectivity criterion for incentives and 
established four priorities, in which the "basic industries" (cernent, pulp, 
capital goods, etc.) were the top on the list. Second priority was given to 
consumer goods satisfying primary needs of the population, while the 
other two catégories ernbodied ail t.he test without a too clear distinction. 
Whereas the objectives and priorities were different from those of the 
previous law, the policy instruments rernained the came, with the only 
difference that protection and subsidies were much larger and the control 
system became much more cornplicated. Thus, tax holidays, subsidised 
credit, over-valued local currency and tariff and non-tariff barriers were 
the main components of the recipe. 
These provisions were complemented with the "Labour Community Law, 
which established the "Industrial communities", to allow workers' 
participation in management, 25% of annual profits and ownership, with 
the aim of reaching a 50/50 share distribution between capital invest.ors 
and labour.Besides, in 1974 the government promoted a "social property 
sector" of State-sponsored and worker-owned enterprises under the 
inspiration of the Yugosiav model. Finally, a "labour stability law gave 
worke-rS fob secur itÿ alter tlii-Ce m,onnt- i,S oi ser vILe. 
Weak performance and a highly inefficient structure of industry were the 
resuit of the strategy begun in the late 1950's and vigorously pursued 
during 1969-1978. Although the traditional industries (textiles, 
garments, beverages, etc.) continuel to be important, industrialisation 
during the 1970's rnarkedly rnoved towards processing of natural resources 
and was heavily concentrated in chemicals, basic metals, metal products 
and non-metallic minerais. These are relatively capital-intensive 
industries and, consequently, contributed to an increase in the sector's 
overail capital intensity by at least 50% in real ternis during the period 
1971-1978. This capital intensive bics prevented the sector from 
generating significant employment opportunities. For instance, the 
capital- intensive garments industry rernained stagnant while the capital 
intensive spinning industry became larger and dynamic. 
in spite of the inventives to production and the benefit of a captive 
market, industrial policies during the 1970's created uncertainty and were 
not efficient in promoting the massive private investment that industrial 
development required. Cornplex regulations not only enlarged bureaucracy, 
but also contributed to the consolidation of trade oligopolies, wvhich, in 
turn, favoured collusion with the industrial enterprises and high prises. 
The disastrous performance of manufactured exports affected other 
sectors, like rnining, that contributed the foreign exchange for imports of 
capital goods and inputs. 
The economic stabilisation policies implemented in 1976 forced 
industries to change their behaviour. The domestic market was severely 
affected by the economic crisis and the devaluation as well as other 
inventives for exports shifted production af many firms to outside 
rîmarkets. Even though manufactured exports increased substantially from 
US$ 83 million in 1975 to US$ 676 million in 1979, their share in total 
production averaged 9%. 
industrial development in the 1980's 
In 1980 the government of Fernando Belaùnde completely changed the 
rules of the game for the industrial sector, and also radically altered the 
strategic perspective of "inward" to "outward" development. A new 
industrial law, enforced in 1982, p!aced greater emphasis on exports and 
gave priority to industries located in poor regions of the country. The 
abrupt nature of the changes, particularly the lowering of import tariffs, 
put the industrial sector under severe economic stress. Donmestic 
recession and few openings for exports abroad further aggravated the 
problem. 
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The sector's growth declined between 1981 and 1983, perlod ln 
contraband and dumping affected industries like textiles, paper and home 
appliances. Growth was moderately resumed in 1984-1985. At that time 
the government estirnated that about 40% of installed industrial capacity 
was lying idle. 
The APRA government returned to old protectionist policies and 
re-directed growth towards the dornestic market. The new administration 
opted for an economic mode] that emphasizes industrial reactivation based 
on an expansion of denmand tri roiugh p r 1 c e f r e e z e and réai salary iricreases, 
which would be matched by a burst in supply, based on existing idle 
capacity. 1986 saw the manufacturing sector growing at l 8 4, the highest 
rate ever recorded, alter a moderate 3% in 1985. In spite of this recovery, 
value adried by manufacturing grew only 7 ô in real terres bet;wreen 1977 
and 1986, compared with a 12% in GDP as a whole. Manufacturing 
currently employs about 10% of the workforce and accounts for 
approximately 25% for more than a decade. 
A recent study shows an interesting development of smali and medium 
industries, especially in certain manufacturing activities. It wati found 
Chat. in three branches, srnall ennterprises (between fine and 20 woî kers), 
accounted for a significant proportion of the total number of production 
value of pi r duction, and the generation of employment. For instance 
in the gai-ment and leather industries, small and medium enterprises 
account for more of total production value. 
The three main policy making and implementation agencies of the sector 
are the Mlnistry of Industry and Tourism, the "Inst.ituto de Investigaciôn y 
Teconologla Industrial y de Normas Técnicas" (ITINTEC) and the "Consejo 
Nacional de Ciencia y Teconologia" (CONCYTEC). The main research 
priorities are the ways of reducing dependence of manufactures on 
imported inputs, studies on the development of capital goods industries, 
Industrial sector re-structuring, and mechanisms to promote the 
development of small and medium enterprises. 
7.--MiN1NG 
The Peruvian mining sector plays a significant role in the national 
ecoromy and is the primary source of foreign exchange. 8ecause of the 
geological formation of the Andes, Perù ranks among the six major mining 
countries in the world: it is the sixth producer of copper, the third of 
zinc, the fourth of lead, the second of silver and bismuth. Its proven 
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reserves are 27 million tons of copper (fine content), 836 million tons of 
iron, 14 million ounces of gold, 858 million ounces of silver and five 
million tons of lead. However, Perù has only tapped about 5% of its total 
mining resources and the sector provides employment to less than 2% of 
the labour force. 
Per(r's minerai wealth was aiready known to the Incas who extracted gold 
and silver for ritual purposes and copper for tools and weapons. These 
minerais were transformed to 99 â pure metais through ingenous 
processes. 
ith the ai -rival of the Spaniards began a series of boom-bust 
cycles linked to mining activities. During the nineteenth century, after 
Independence, the mining sector Vvent through one of several prolonged 
depressed periods. 
Three factors revived interest of foreign investors in Perû's mining 
resources towards the end of the nineteenth century. One was a 1890 law 
that freed t.he mining industry of ail taxes, except for a special mining 
duty, and forbade taxation of the industry for 25 years. The second factor 
was the construction of a railway between the coast and the central 
Andes. The third one was the development of t.echnoiogy for minerai 
concentration by flotation, that revolutionized the processsing of copper, 
lead, zinc and silver. 
By the early twentieth century, foreign enterprises were aiready operating 
in Perd. In 1922 a large smelting operation was set up at La Oroya in the 
central Andes. In the 1920's the government escaiated taxation on mining 
operations and foreign interest decreased. The sector entered once again 
into a relatively long period of slow expansion. 
Foreign capital poured again in the 1950's, mainly because of the Mining 
Code that substantially lowered the tax liabilities of mining companies. 
Production of ail minerais grew vigorously. in spite of the sharp fait in 
world metal prices between the Korean war and 1962, the growth of 
volume allowed value to expand at an_average annual rate of 12% between 
1951 and 1962. 
During the 1960's no new major investments were made.' As investrnent 
contracted, output in the sector staganated and total export volume grew 
by only 3.5% between 1961 and 1969. Nevertheless, export value did grow 
by over 1 2ô yearly, due to an almost 1 0ô increase in prices. 
In 1968 the military government introduced drastic changes in the sector, 
airned at three main objectives: to reduce foreign predominance, to 
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acceler'ate growth, and to distribute a larger share of the incorrre 
generated to the workers. Foreign and domestic firms were allowed to 
participate, but basically in partnership with the State or in rr,ediurn and 
srnall-scale operations. To build up the institutional framework through 
which to irnplement its new policy, the government created MINEROPERU in 
1971, as the main prornoter and owner of large rnining programmes. In 
1973, MINPECO, a State-owned monopoly for the foreign and domestic 
marketing of most metals was also established. Two expropriations gave 
birth to two huge companies CENTROMIN PERD and HIERRO PERU. 
In the early 1970's, Mih.EROPERU began extensive project planning and in 
1973 errmbarked on its first project, a new 150,000 tons copper refinery at 
ilo in trie departrnent of Arequipa. The refinery, built by a Japanese 
contractor as a tur n-key operation, was corrlpleted in 1975. Parallel to 
this project the Mate company started its own works in two oher 
projects: the copper mine of Cerro Verge (Arequipa) and a phosphate mine 
at Bayovar (Piura), The latter was intended allow the eliaboration of 
fertilizers in order to substitute imports. MINEROPERU also increased the 
country`s r efir,ing capacity building a zinc refinery in Cajamarquilia (near 
Lirria), which started operations in 1981. The Cerro Verde project ran into 
prr:bleris arid trie expansion of tri e mine ri as been difflcu1t to finance 
During the ferirod 1970-1976, only two major projects were developed and 
rnining output was virtually flat. Production was affected by prolonged 
strikes in 1975--1976 and also by the drop in international demand, mainly 
for copper. However, the value of exports expanded at an annual rate over 
6.5 principally because of a 67,, increase in the average export price of 
minerais exported by Perû. The Ilo fefinery mitigated the negative impact 
of low world prices, by increasing the share of Peruvian copper refined 
domesticaily from 19% in 1975 to 25% in 1976. 
Mirting in the 1980's 
The government of Fernando Bela(nde tried to promote domestic and 
foreign private direct investment in the sector. In 1981 the State 
rnonopoiy of MINPECO on refining and marketing was eliminated and the 
Executive branch of the State was authorized to grant concessions on ores 
previously reserved for State exploitation. Aiso, MINEROPERU was 
authorized to develop joint ventures with private firrns for large scale 
projects previously reserved for public enterprises. Tax reductions and 
tax legislation stability until 1998 were also offered as incentives for 
investment. 
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In spite of these efforts, the only recent major developments were 
CENTROMIN's Cobriza copper mine which carne on strearn in mid- 1982, and 
a joint venture with State participation for the Tintaya copper mine in 
mid- 1985. 
Currently, entrepreneurial activity in the sector extends from smail scale 
local projects to huge international company operations run by national 
and foreign enterprises. The largest mining corporations are CENTROMIN 
PERD, HIERRO PERU, MINEROPERU and the foreign company Southern PerO 
Copper Corporation (SPCC). Toget.her these companies account for 
two-thirds of the country'S total mining production and 40 fo of the 
sector's employment. Twenty mediurn-scale mines and hundreds of 
'cale _nte:rprises make up rest of the sector, Most of the 
rneditrm sale rTiines are polyrnetallic (prodominantly lead, zinc and silver) 
and bave evolved int.o eff lciently rrianaged operations capable of competing 
in the international market. Copper accounts for slightly less than half of 
total metal production. 
During 1985, production in the mining sector grew, for the second 
con Secutive year, by approximately 6%, increasing the sector's 
participation in the CCDP to more thanl2 This performance was achieved 
c e plie epre'_,Sed international prices for minerais. Dur ing 1986, IL sector entered a difficult period, mainly due to a 28 b increase in 
production costs, a f ixed exchange rate, and further dec i ine in prices, 
which determined a fall of 4% in the annual production. During 1987 the 
situation bas not been different and both production and value of exports 
decli ned during the first semester. 
Serious doubts about the future of this key sector for the Peruvian 
economy are being expressed by experts. It is estimated that if prices 
continue at their current low leveis or decline even further, the sector 
would staganate for at least 18 years. Moreover, many of the potential big 
projects would not be economically viable even at much higher prices, 
i;ecat_rse of financial costs, the retreat of foreign investors from such 
long-run ventures, the Stat.e's lack of capital resources and the 
uncertainty about profits. Considering that in trie past m ineral resources 
have financed a good deal of economic gowth, such a prospect forces 
Peruvians to redefine the country's developrnent strategy. Besides, since 
growth based on the foreign exchange generated by this sector has made 
the Peruvian economy too vulnerable to external variables, it is indis 




Perû is richly endowed with energy resources. Hydro power is its largest 
potential source, although 4% of that potential has been developed, 
Hydrocarbon resources are about 1.4 billion barrels of oil (836 proven and 
538 probable) and 1.9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The estimate for 
coal reserves Is of about one billion tons, not ail of them recoverable. 
Forent resources, which cover alinost 60 4 of its territory, are 
concentrated in the thinly populated Aniazonian region. 
Biomes energy sources met around 32% of total demand, with commercial 
energy providing the other 68 4, In rural areas most of the energy 
consurrlption is blomass, while commercial one is very low (one-seventh of 
the urban areas consomption). The modern sector of the Peruvian economy 
iv basf'd on ligl'id fuels, which cover more than 70% of its demand. 
Petroleum accounts for 60% of energy consuniption in the industriel 
_,ector, 67 in the mining sector, and 10OF in transport. 
Pe :roleum andjs 
Commercial oil production in Perù dates to the nineteenth century and was 
concentrated in the nort.hwestern region. Perù was a net oil exporter 
between 1930 and 1960, but became a net importer until significant 
mener= ees w r rm e r-.: d 3' An es in +re Il 9l c r.i ..._ avec e cor}il1 tÇr cla s devel s, iop test of t.lle ' r i .ici, 
Crude oil production remained relatively constant between 1970 and 1976 
but increased dramatically thereafter, when the petroleum produced in the 
Arnazon was pumped through the 852 km. Trans-Andean pipeline that 
began operating in 1977. Two-thirds of Perü's oil output is pumped from 
the Amazon through this pipeline to the port of Bayovar on the northern 
coast. Net imports of oil amounted to US$ 220 million in 1977 while net 
exports were US$ 145 million in 1978. 
The ownership and development of the country's oil resources is under trie 
direction of PETROPERU, a State-owned enterprise established in 1969, 
PETROPERU is responsible for the domestic supply of crude oii and oil 
products, for ail r'ef ining, marketing and basic petro-cheriliical activities 
in t.he country, either by itself or through contracts with other companies. 
The State-owried company now accounts for half of total oil production 
and operates six refineries with a distillation capacity of 180,000 barrels 
per day. Petrochemical plants inciude carbon-black and a solvents plant 
,vîvhich produces acétone and isopropylic alcohol. 
Foreign companies have been operating in Perû under production sharing 
agreements with PETROPERU, though specific conditions have varied 
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through tire. The original formula, called the "Peruvian Model", ruas based 
on a 50% oil split between the State-owned enterprise and the foreign 
contractor, tax stability for the latter, and PETROPERU assum.ing the 3019 
income tax on total production. If no oil was discovered in seven years the 
area returned to PETROPERU. Besides, the latter had the right to choose 
50% of the area, provided ail plots were united in a single block. 
Occidental Petroleum was the first firm to sign SSuch contracts and also 
trie one that discovered the largest commercial reserves in the Armzon 
i egion. Several other international firms signed contracts but their 
exploration efforts turned out to be cornmercially inviable. 
In December 1980, shortly before transferring power to the constitutional r } r r n +.he military trHiie oll contracts d astic 
changes in the international rnarket. The main modifications included the 
obligation of trie contractor to pay incorne tax, the reduction of the 
r:ploration t 'rmri frorn seven to six ;'gars, and a nevi formula that reduced 
the contractor's shaire proporrtionally to the increase in oll prices, and trie 
elirriination of the tax stability clause. 
These conditions were modified again by trie constitutional governrnent 
si ortly after taking office in July 1980. A prime concern of trie riew 
adrrinistrat on was the decline in exploration activities Chat, coupled with 
projected growth in domestic demand reflecting increased economic 
activity, t1rlreatened to transform the country again in a îet importer by 
the miid-198%'s, Drilling activity declined beginning in mid-1975 as a 
result of reduced expectations of finding new oil and little incentives by 
the The new governrrient declared that trie contracts were 
promnoting exploitation and quick profits but were discouraging 
exploration. In order to redress this trend, a new petroleum law ;{pas 
erac:t=d trying to stirriulate successful explorations. The new provisions 
rrï âintairied the 50/5:0 oil split and trie contractor's obligation to pay 
incorne tax, but introduced specific incentives that incle-rded incorne tax 
credits for reinvestrnents which result in new production areas, graduai 
elimination of export taxes, and trie opening of secondary recovery 
projects, previously reserved for PETROPERU. 
The results of such policier have been pour. Decline in oil prices, trie 
uncertainty created by trie APRA government's expropriation of trie Beico 
off-shore operations in 1985 and PETROPERU's lack of financial resources, 
have further aggravated the problern. Production has declined from 
200,000 bpd in 1985 to an estirnated 160,000 bpd in 1987. This drastic 
fall is not orily due to decline in reserves but also because of serious 
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financial shortages in PETROPERU. Because of the drop in trie rate of 
production and due to the fail in the quality of the crude, PETROPERU is 
preparing to import light crude oil. Exports in 1986 feil to US$ 235 
million, from US$ 645 million in 1985, due to lower production and 
international prices, For 1987, exports are forecasted at 48,000 bpd 
compared with 59,000 bpd in 1986, further reducing foreign exchange 
revenues in spite of better international oil prices. Most important of all, 
oil reserves have fallen to 500 million barrels, enough for less than eight 
years' supply at present production rates, compared with 835 million 
barrels in 1982. 
In spite of this bleak scenario, a recent gas discovery by the Royal Dutch 
Shell company in an area between the departments of Ucayali and Cusco in 
tige southern tropical forests, offers trie potential of transforming the 
country's long term enrgy outiook. Reserves are estimated at ten trillion 
cubic feet, equivalent to two billion barrels of oil, and are the third 
lorgest deposits in Latin America, after Venezuela and Argentina. The 
de'v'elopmer1t of these reserves, however, pose a formidable challenge since 
t.wa 1500 km, pi )ei ires would be needed. The pipelines and the separation 
plants would cost more than one billion U.S. dollars, excluding trie 
installation of downstr-eam pipelines and the colts of tri nsforming the 
oil fired plants to utilise gas. Other options include the export of the gas 
to BjraLjl thro g;l Bolivia, where Occidental Petroleum han pipeline 
facilities. Off-shore gas reserves discovered by Belco before it was 
Expropriated raised interest. in this energy source, HowL er, uncertainties 
about its exploitation have hampered developments in this respect. 
Several local and international researchers and consultants have stressed 
the need to undertake detailed studies about the potential for natural gas 
as an alternate source of energy. Oil savings would help t.o increase 
exports and/or extend the life of the existing reserves. 
Biomass 
The vast majority of the Peruvian population depends on fuelwood and 
residues for cooking fuel. Therefore, biomass energy is of particular 
importance in the formulation of a national energy policy, especially 
because traditional biomass fuels meet subsistence needs of the poorest 
strata of the population, mainly in the rural Andes. However, fuelwood 
supplies are becoming progressively scarce, precisely in the Andes, vJh;ch 
as less thon 0:5%% of tl,e country's foi-est resources. Therefore, 
reforestation efforts are urgently needed to slow the depletion of stock. 
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Regional scarcities are clear from statistics on wood and charcoal 
production. Out of 24 departments, six (Ancsh Cajamarca, Cusco, Junin 
Piura and Puno) produce over hall of the total wood consumed in the 
country. The situation of charcoal is even more constrained, with two 
departments (Lambayeque and Loreto) producing 95% of the officially 
reported charcoal output. Due to the dramatic deforestation of the Andes, 
the government has made the production and transport of charcoal to Lima 
illegal. 1iowever, a study made in 1983 revealed that controls were 
extremely loose and the forest conservation objective was not being 
achieved. 
Annual fuelwood consumption is estimated at about 4.5 million cubic 
metre s, or O.64 ct_1.m./capit.a/year over a regional population of Seven 
million, Although the Ministry of Energy and Mines (rMEM), the General 
Direction of Fore stry and Fauna (DOFF), and the National Institute of 
Forest.ry and Farina (INFOR), ail agree that the deforestation is extremely 
severe, the exact rate has not been determined because of inadequate 
distinction in available statistics between systemat.ic clearcutting, rapid 
forest degradation by partial cutting, and prevention of forest generation 
by . gr icultural clearing and livestock grazing. in adition, animal dung is 
being. diverted from its use as a fertili er to use as cooking fuel, rF_,_rlting 
in a boas of band fertility and food production. 
Fuel t-lod pr oblems and forestry are closely interwoven, so information 
about research projects, institutions and action programmes are dealt 
with in the "Agriculture" section of this document - 
Electricity 
Available information indicates that slightly over 407o of the population in 
Pers; bas electricity service. There is unsatisfied demand in the areas 
served by public-service concessionaires, and some industrial and 
agricultural activities have to generate their own electricity at high costs 
in spite of being located close to electricity production facilities, because 
there is no alternate supply. Also, income levels of most pf the 60% of the 
population now not served as well as t.opographic difficulties impose 
serious limitations to service expansion. 
Aiso, during the 1970's the power sector suffered a significant outflow of 
professionals and technically skilled personnel, resulting in 
sion-mating problems and Inadequate maintenance of regional power 
systems. Even though the problem is not severe for the Lima area, 
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The resource base, however, is irnpressive. The 1977-1979 country-wide 
survey of hydroelect ric resources indicated a theoretical poltential or 
206,000 MW, 30% of which bas since been identified as technically 
feasible. The richest water resources are located in the eastern slopes of 
the Ands and upper tropical forests, with more than V00% of the total 
installble capacity. The Pacific watersbed accounts for 14% and offers 
advantages for high head developrnents close to large markets. The rest of 
trie potential belongs to the Puno departrnent in the Lake Titicaca basin. 
This huge potential the difficulties involved in linking 
plants based on these resources to the major actual and potential rnarkets, 
rnainly cities along the coast and rnining centres in the Andes, matie the 
financing and development of projects extremely Nard, 
The organization of trie Peruvian power sector has undergone significant 
changes in the 1ast 15 years. in 1972, the government issued a law which 
made the State the sector's primary actor. ELECTROPERU was created as 
an enterprise by merging four existing entities involved in power 
generation and distribution. Power sector assets which previously had 
been financed by customer contributions became State property. The State 
also acquired control of foreign-held utility shares, aiid a policy of 
national tariff equalization was adopted. 
In 1982, another lawfww established that the of trie electricity 
activities had to be tiecentralised. ELECTROPERU retained overall 
responsibility for sector planning, management and development, while 
electric service would be provided by regional and local utilities. MEM 
rnay aiso grant concessions to independent producers to develop 
hydroelectric or geotherrnal resources as a cornplement to ELECTROPERU's 
national power development plan. 
EigtIt public service utilities now operate in t rie country. ELECTROLIMA lis 
trie largest of these companies, serving 56% of consumers, all in 
metropolitan Lirria. Self-producers, that account for approximately 
one--third of Perû's total installed capacity, are led by the mining 
enterprises SPCC and CENTROMIN PERU. 
Total generation of electricity in Perû grew by an average 6% per year 
during the period 1972-1980, with output by public service cornpanies 
gr C'vv Îng a, Û o per ain1 lui 1-1 a1-1 d iridepe,,UCrit produi-ers at or i iy 2,6(oper a ri nuil 1. 
T rie evüilition of er ergy con suirption in trie existing publ ic-service 
electricity systems depends not only on the country's growth, but aiso on 
the installed capacity and energy availability. In Tact, a fairly recent 
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study by the World Bank, pointed out that in Perû, the correlations of 
electricity demand with global econornic indicators are somewhat erratic 
in the short terni. For instance, a boom in the mining sector bas littie 
impact on public service demand growth, since most mining operations 
generate their own electricity. The same report indicates that the sector 
lacked a realistic expansion programme for the period 1983-1993, mainly 
due to planning defficiencies. One of the main problems is the lack of 
resources to increase investment in hydropower, since electricty is 
heavily subsidised and a significant percentage of production in places 
like Lima is not being billed. 
Two other serious problems are also affecting the sector. A significant 
portion of the generating plant operated by ELECTROPERU and local 
governiients is out of service because funds and personnel are too scarce J 
or simply lacking. Another problem is that with the exception of bagasse 
used as fuel in sugar mills, thermal capacity installed by autoproducers 
consumes petroleum products. 
T he MEM and ELECTROPERU have def ined a work programme to create 220 
small generation, transmission and distribution systems, ait an estimated 
cost of US$ 200 million. Srnall Hydro facilities are also a matter of study 
at a national level to provide electricity in the rural areas. In 1979 1,138 
rural Centres wlt.h good possibilities were identifled. About half of tiiose 
I-iad no acces to the service. In spite of these advances, a more coordinated 
planning and data on rural demand are stili lacking. Research in 
these areas iS indispensable. Other topics for research are the potential 
for producing turbines and spare parts in the country and the development 
of an standardization of technical designs, construction types and 
materials in order to reduce costs and facilitate maintenance. 
Goal and other energy sources 
The actual quantity of Peruvian coal reserves is still uncertain and 
estimat.es vary widely, although several sources contend that reserves are 
about one billion tons. Even though these reserves are "inferred", there are 
indications that while some of the coal is sufficiently co4<able to be used 
in a mixture with imported coking coals, the bulk of it is steam coal. 
Lignite is also known t.o exist in Tumbes and in the northern part of the 
Amazon region. No systerrmatic study has been made of these deposits. 
Perû had a prosperous coal mining industry until the end of World War 11, 
but production steadily declined since then. Production began to increase 
af ter 1975, and output of that year, was doubled in 1981. There are ample 
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possibilities of developing srnall coal mines if a firm market is 
established and credit provided. The principal consumers of coal today are 
the steel industry and the small smelters and brickworks around Lima and 
Trujillo. However, the potential rnarket is much larger if conversion from 
oil is adequately prornoted in thermal power plants, cernent works, metal 
smelting, and even households. One of the ideas that has been under 
discussion for some time is the ellaboration of coal briquettes for 
household use. The briquettes could substitute heavily subsidised 
kerosene and scarce wood as a cooking fuel. Besides, the process of 
rnonuf._atctt_;ring is fairly simple and both rrioids and stoves could be made by 
the local industry involving little or no foreign exchange costs. 
1 iowever, a recent report on the issue stated that the efforts to develop 
6.^ r i - J rr ta t r r.._ -J ,-. rn -. r !:. co al tnt_,utry woul face ev'eral onst(a nts crrcuit a firiir.iiy 
established market: lack of suitable coal burning equipment for household 
and industry use, Jack of detailed geological surveys, inappropriate nature 
of large-scale rnechanized mining for prevalent geological conditions, and 
difficulty in transporting coal from the mines to potential markets on the 
Coast, 
A step towards the development of the coal industry was made in 1981 
with the establishment of the State-owned Empresa Promotora de] Carbôn 
-rider the management of four large State corporations. The 
instituto Geolôgico Minero Metalûrgico (INGEMMET) has made some studies 
on the coal rilining industry, but its results have not been disseminat'ed: 
Data on geothermal energy in Perû are scarce and of very poor quality. 
However, considering that the gradients in South America generally are 
high in the Andes area, the geothermal resource base of the country is 
probably above worid average. Until recently, little interest existed in 
geothermal power, despite the fact that the geology of the southern part 
of the country iS very favourable for its development. Very recently, 
ELECTROPERU and SPCC, which bas copper mines and smelter facilities in 
the area, have slrown some interest in developing this potential source. 
However, there are serions institut.ional constraints to geothermal 
developrrient in Perû. On the one hand, the private sector is prohibited by 
law to develop such resources. On the other, ELECTROPERU and INGEMMET 
lack the experience, equipment, hurnan and financial resources to do 
research and development. 
Perù's geographic location favours the development of solar and wind 
energy. Work on solar and wind energy is strongly attached to the public 
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technological research institute ITINTEC, and to a lesser degree, to the 
National University of Engineering, UNI. ITINTEC developed programmes 
that have resulted in the installation of solar water heaters in CENTROMIN 
mining centres in the central Andes and in a textile factory in Arequipa, 
among oth er cases. Also, windmills were installed in Puno and there are 
sonne 2000 of them to purnp irrigation water in the Mirarnar area of Piura. 
in spite of these achievements, there is a vacuurn in the marketing and 
dissemination of these renewable energy technologies. Littie work was 
done in deiîionstratirig their relatively simple technical features and therr 
economic advantages. In this senne, ITINTEC's links with industry could be 
better used, especially for commercial-scale local manufacturing of the 
equipments, and coordination with other government agencies could be 
eohanced. 
I1_-MAÇROECONNOMI P [ 
The quality and continuity of irtacro-econorrmic policies las been a problern 
for Pers throughout its history. Unlike countries like Colombia, where 
despite political changes the basic econé rnic policy guidelines have been 
respected for decades, in Perû trie rule is that political changes are 
invariably encorrlplassed by abrupt modifications of macro-economic 
policier. In rnany cases, the internai coherence of policies is is not very 
clear, in otheirs jack of k.now,'vledge about interrelated phnornena, litre the 
link-, between inflation and devaluation, lead to serious mistakes in policy 
making. - 
Two kinds of problems, which in fact are closely interwoven, can be found 
in tris area: trie long-term "structural" issues, and the continuons need 
for short-term economic stabilisation measures once the economy has 
reached a point of intolerable inbalance. Problems like long-run slow 
growth, overail worsening of income distribution, strong dependence from 
irae rnat.ional boom-boost cycles in the international economy, and 
récurrent balance of payments bott.lenecks typically belong to the first 
rateegory, but manifest thernselves in conjunctural crises Chat are.usually 
t ;l- led vv ith classiC short-terra economic and f inancial measures. 
Since the mid-1970's Perû has suffered pervasive macro-economic 
disequilibria and, with the exception of very short periods, is the victim 
of a recession that lasts for more than a decade. By thé r id-1980's per 
capita income had been reduced to levels below those prevailing in the 
mid-1960's. Both inflation and devaluation reached historical peaks by 
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1985, despite a price freeze and a fixed exchange rate. 
The problem is further aggravated by a huge external debt that in 1985 
represented 95% of the GDP and whose service dernanded more than 50% of 
total export foreign exchange earnings. Falls in domestic savings and 
investment cast serious doubts on the viability of self-sustained 
development, that appears as the only alternative considering the current 
international finanr_ial drought, let atone the isolation of the country due 
to its position of not paing the externat debt be'rond the équivalent of 10% 
of its exports. 
Although the causes of such bleak prospects are multiple, there is a vide 
consensus Chat part economic policies have a great responsibility for this 
situation, Large public t eficits, loose rnonetary policies, disincentives to 
exports, excessive external borrowing, poor income distribution, Jack of 
savings and investment are problems Chat require detailed studios 
oriented to better policy design and impiementation. The social and 
economic impact of such policies cannot be overstressed, since the 
v biiit.y of democracy and of Per(i as an independent nation-state are at 
stake. 
The APRA government bas opted for an original, though risky, heterodox 
econoric policy, which seeks to push for high growth rates. The little 
incentives given to exports means that growth avili be financed by 
government expenditure, regardless of the deficits it can generate. Also, 
substantial increases in demand, envisaged as the best way to create a 
dynarnic circle of growth, will stimulate production at tige beginning but, 
once the installed capacity is fully utilised and foreign exchange become 
scarce due to increases in imports, the crisis will be inevitable. This is 
not unlikely since Perti bas no access to international financial resources, 
and the mobilisation of domestic resources has not been successsful. 
Tberefore, the risks of hyper-inflation and supply shortages are high. 
0n the other hand, the ortodox stabilisation policies do not offer a better 
alternative, rince the austerity they impose on society, particularly on the 
poor, is not compensated by a substantial flow of external resources or 
tige guarantee of sustained growth once the equilibrium is restored. Hence, 
research on rracro-economic topics is not only important but also urgent. 
The research capacity in these fieid is substantial. Universities, mainly 
private, and néon goverrumierital organizatiors have the humais resour CES 
experience to carry out highly sophisticated research on its various topics. 




For a long time Per( had a relatively passive role in foreign affairs, which 
led to an inordinate influence by foreign countries, notably the United 
States. During the 1970's the military government sought an independent, 
non- aligned course in its foreign relations, through the "diversification of 
deperlderlce". The establishment of diplomatic relations with the socialist 
countries and more intense contacts with nations of western Europe and 
Asia markred a more active approach to foreign affairs. With this new 
int rnational 'stratetet_y the milltar'y pursued economic nd political gains, 
litre access to financial and arms markets as well as trie recognition of the 
"Peruvian Revolution". The ex.pected outcome was that new international 
political alliances would counteract a potential blockade or other 
econoMlic retaliation policier by the United States, aft.er thle 
expropriation of several U.S. companies. 
The shift of the Peruvian foreign policy was evident in many fronts, 
incll._rdirtg r }r_rltilateral organizations, For instance, Perù reversed its 
position with respect to the exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of 
American States (OAS), supporting the lifting of sanctions, Its active 
participation in tige Andean Pact, as an alternative to the Latin American 
Free T} ade Association (LAFTA), and in the creation of the Latin American 
Economic ` `çtem (SELA), also reflects a clear interest in assuming a 
position of leadership in Latin Arnerica, especially during the first haif of 
the 1970's. 
Former territorial disputes with various neighbours have a decisive 
weit,ht in Peruvian foreign policy. During the 1970's the political presence 
of the military underscored this factor. However, the Tact that the 
military the professional career path of diplomate and kept to a 
minimum their interference in the formulation and implementation of 
foreign policy, a reasonable balance between strictly military 
defense measures and diplornatic initiatives oriented to reduce tensions 
and build long term peaceful relations on a sound basis. 
The t.'ro more difficult issues in this respect were the rivairies with 
Eçu ador tard Chile, and the Bolivian condition of country, The 
refusai of Ecuador to fully accept the ternis of the international 
; gr eement reached in 1942, which fixes the legal boundaries between both 
countries, has been, and stili is, a source of tension between tiaem. 
Officiai Ecuadorean maps show a large part of the Peruvian departments of 
Loret.o and Amazona, as part of Ecuador, violating tlle agreement. Border 
skia mishes have erupted on occasions, and a blttz»-izéq took place in 1981, 
71 
when Ecuadorean troops huilt mil itary Installations several kilorrmetres 
within Peruvian territory, in a zone where surveillance is extremely 
difficuit. 
The latent conflict with Chile is more complicated. Historicai resentment 
over the lors of vast and valuable territory in the 1879 Pacific War 
presents a potentialiy more serions source of conflict. Although bilateral 
relations im proved during the i 9 60's and early 1970's, when Ceneral 
Velasco and President Salvador Allernde m _ de efforts in this direction, 
Mit_J :+!_: ri d _eri r ated in the raid-1970 s, after the military coup inn Chile, 
and wlth approach of the war centennial in 1979. After rather serions 
dip imat.lc incidents and r-umour-"s of skirmishes in trie border, the rililitary 
conflict did not materialize. However, an orninous arms race developed 
between botte countries as tiieir miilitary leaders justified large purcl, - i Kâses 
of rr7ilit,r-y equipment, substantially increasing their externat debts, by 
the need to match the other's acquisitions. In spite of this setback, 
relations have improved steadily during the 1980's. 
i'ollvia aiso lost territory during the Pacific War, and with it access to a 
Pacific Ocean port. The Treaty of Ancôn, signed to put an end to the +.:rri Îrir1 dispute, r p. v lu.r~o { t.hat Pt-rC tins to h e c;, tns lte d and must 
consent to any Chilean concession of former Peruvian territory. 
Successive discussions between Chi le and Bolivia, during the mid- 1970's 
and more recently in the first half of the 1980's, have encountered 
Per t_;vian courit.erproposals that somehow inf luenced the aiready 
uncornfor table negotiations between t.hose countries. After some tense 
periods when negotiations broke clown, Peruvian-Bolivian relations have 
warmed again. 
The Peruvian diplomatic strategy to reduce border tensions with its 
reitll"ibo!_,rs has heen, end still is, based on the development of key common 
interests, _ ,,, , eveit,, t in tcase of Ecuador, ` he reir. _avian 
propos,ed the irmiplerrlentation of a common irrigation project in the border 
area and offered access to the Amazon river, the heart of the dispute, 
provided certain regulations are respected by Ecuador. The irrigation 
scheme, named Puyango-Tumbes af ter the rivers involved,. seeks to jointly 
develop agriculture in a rather depressed border area. An agreement tiras 
signed by both parties in 1970 and, after a series of discussions and 
setbacks, they finally ellaborated in 1987 the common terres of reference 
for the project that wi l l start in 1989, 
A series of initiatives have also been taken by the Peruvian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to iriiprove Peruvian-C.hilean relations. Discussions about 
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the possibility of establishing an area of "shared-sovereignty" with that 
country and Bolivia have taken place in amicable terms. But the most 
important one is related to the reduction of military expenditure through a 
rnutual commitment to peace, Conversations started in 1985 and 
irrteresting advances ha,,é,e been made, up to the point that Perù halved a 
warplane purchase order to Fronce in 1986. 
In the case of Bolivia, Perré granted free access to the southern ports of ilo 
and Matarani to facilitate its exports. Besides, both countries are 
studying the possibilïty of taking advantage of the Lake Titicaca waters 
for agricultural development. 
Relations with Brazil have been at best distant for a long Lime, 
e ! r-. i !d' 1 fiLftl s r'!--;! a.} !r: l kke, d a r n e w p :{! 0 d 0f CI o _. s e r t i r s , pl.O !r',! i r t h e ! =<80 t il rioted by 
Per uyrian govrernrïient. Although no territorial disputes existed between 
bot.h nations, Brazil's rapid development of its Amazon region near the 
r eruvian border is a rii atter of concern, but at the sarcle Lime is perceived 
:_,s an opport,_rnity to develop one of the rïiost neglected border regions. A 
r'rieeting between the presidents of both eountries in iiiid-1987 has opened 
avenues for cooperation and joint development efforts. Brazil's 
interest in i,)ecom.i!irig a world power demand, orinong other things, a way out 
to t.he Pacif ic Ocean, and Perr_i is the rrrost adv.antageous alternat iv'e for 
t.hat pr_irp ose in the long run. 
During the second government of Fernando Bela(nde (1980-1985), Peruvian 
foreign policy lowered its profile but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
maintained sonie of the previous basic guidelines. The APRA government 
has reinstated a high profile diplormiacy, including a very active 
participation in the non-aligned movement as weil as in international 
economic negotiations regarding debt and basic products. Other policy 
objectives include the validation of geographical rights related to marine 
r e'_c urce s in the 200 miles, to natural resources in the Antartic, and the 
recognition of Perd as an Equatorial country with privileged access to 
slots in the geostationary orbit to place satellites. 
Research on international relations' issues is relatively, recent in Perd. 
Endowed with a critical mass of highly qualified diplomats, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs develops its own investigation activities, but rarely 
disseminates thern. The establishment of non governmental organizations, 
like the "Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales" (CEPEI) and the 
"Asociaclôn Peruana para la Paz" (APEP), has prornoted independent 
research on these topics and has allowed the dissemination of studies 
related to them. Besides, close links between these non governmental 
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organizations and trie Ministry have developed, facilitating a better fl{:.v 
of information and a greater influence of independent experts in foreign 
policy 
1 I.-SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POL I CY 
In the 1950's the saturation of external markets for agricultural products, 
and of internat markets for industrial products, made evident the need to 
develop scientific and technical activities (S & T) in the agrarian and 
sectors. The State took the main rote in this regard, heiping in 
rte. - ^i r u r of ex.i st.in ^ ftit.ut.i;onr^ and creat }ing (revu ,, r oves, l i i the c{ev,_lo ment g irns an I lke t.he 
Institute of Industrial Tecl-lnologiy in 1950 and the National Comisrsion of 
,t_ l'sr r Lr'+_r { ici I _ )_). Tli u 1'!C:l l)IttÇIl1. or t_arily =r In Ltie cwÎJCI{jçt 
ear s strongly reinforced this trend. 
1° tionai olicy and coordination institutions were also established. The 
lational Council for Scien and Tecï;nologay (CONCYTEC) was creat.ed for the J 
formulation of national S & T policier, and to stimulate and finance R & D 
projects in a coordinated fashion. Its major policy guidelines are 
formation of level human resources, ir-rlproving scientific arld 
technological information, prorroting research in priority ,reas, and 
s{;f,por'ting R ¢: D 1r stitutions. 
1nstitutionaidevelop ent 
it was in the 1070's that the issue of scientific and technologic 
capacity becarine an explicit national priority directly linked to inldustrial 
developrnent. Furthermore, the military government created sources of 
stable funding for S &T activities at the sectoral ievel, which did -lot 
des}end on the process of negotiation that governs the bud'getary 
ail c ti .he State r he I, of t , nd its fili ilin_;tr ies T eral i . _S . }f 
industries, Fishing, t-iining, and Communications estabiished percentages 
of the net income of ent.erprises Chat are to be devoted to research and 
uc'v !oK,itit_rlt- i_ & D), The f tr _rt two bad t_o 'hale the i ther twfvo 
1 `.%. This opened thie possibility of a ten-fold increase in S & T irl'v'estment 
overnight. 
It `{ras In the industrial sector wl-;ere the use of this type of funds vent 
fr_lrtht.=st as a w y of ;.- i Impiem-, entirlg+ P the rectoral S & T policy. TIi,IC 
_;;1zatiüï1 in I : ge of this, ITIN T EC, 'iias Created in 1 X72 
mission is to identify, select, assess and control research projects 
Re3;earch projects can be carried out by the enterprises theriîselves, either 
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individually or collectively, or can be contracted to independent research 
centres. If the firm does not use its 2%, this amount goes to ITINTEC, 
which may then apply it to support other programmes of its own. In fact, 
ITINTEC has the additional functions of generating demand for R & D, 
administering 'Chie fonds, and carrying out its o`evil research pirojects in 
selected fields. Also, ITINTEC became the agency in charge of patents, 
trademarks and technical standards for irrdustry. 
Since its approval, the 2 % regulation bas had a very strong influence on 
industrial R & D. Its impact, howeever, bas not been as impressive as the 
projections of its mentors. It is estirrnated that only 40--50 cornpanies 
have established facilities suitable for serious R & D, but the bulk of the 
wrrork carried out in them relates more to quality control than to R & D as 
r h 
T!Îe crisis of the sector since the second hait of the 1970 s has 
4r riuced avalfable funding for industriai R & D activities, Not h.aving a 
budgetary allocation, ITiNTEC now faces the dilerrma of stimuiating 
in-fîouse research in f irms or securing funds by not doing so, G".e of it.s 
main problems is that it is losing its best human resources because of low 
salaries and, soiletimeS, due to the impossibility of firi_arlcing new 
projects. The industrial related knowledge is probably the weakest in the 
t. o!_ntr y. T v'o big dangers erimerge from this: furthei` deteriorat ion or 
destruction of an institutional capacity Chat has cost to the country a big 
and tin af ïcial effort, and lack of support for a vital sector where 
developrr;ent h,opes are concentrated. 
A recent diagnosis revealed the profound crisis in R & D is not limited to 
the industriel sector but affects the entire range of its accivities. In 
1980, Perù spent only 0.33% of its CCDP on the main S & T activities 
(planning and âdministr'ation of S & T, formation of scientists and R & D 
projects). In 1981 CONCYTEC received only 1,6-% of the government 
investment in S & T, and has gradl_lally become a fït_rreaucratic :.ar;ency with 
lit.tle influence over the scientific communit.y, including the public sector. 
Tllo_;qh sp.ars}e -nd not reliable, information rereais Chat very little 
research is currently being done in universities, due t.o pack of funds rand 
adequat.e stimuli, Considering the close iinks between higher éducation 
and S & T development, the crisis affecting the Peruvian universities is 
seriously hmpering research efforts, it not. only limits the capacity for R 
& D work but also affects the quality of teaching and the professional 
accivities in the country. 
Even thot_igh in the present prevailing circurrnstances it is difficult to 
prorriote S & T development, sonie institutional rrieasures can help to 
increase trie impact of research on development. Technology policy should 
not be separated frorrl sectorial policy in order to identify priorities and 
secure the utilisation of research results. Moreover, researchers have to 
approach trie user since the rJery >eginnirïg of the project or prograrrirrie in 
order to secure trie utilisation of research results. Other area where 
substantial improvements can be made is in the coordination of research 
policies, programmes and projects between existing institutions of the 
public and the private sector. In this sense, trie development of Gloser 
link's between thern , non governrriental organizations and private 
consultancy firms would be very positive. 
12.-IfJS-f I-TUT1ONAL AND LÉGAL DE}LLLOPME T 
Political instability and a long record of de rT,:r'r"tr governments 
have beerl outstanding features of Peruvian politics. Hiowever, this long 
pros ss has graduall'y' led the mnajority of the population to the conviction 
r- r r-.. dis 1 r r n lia iiie + e:mocratlc sy.;tern i,s in pensable for economic progress, 
personal safety and trie developrrient of cultural values. Proofs of this are 
}1- i r } 'ir }i. }hr r four e } n i i and e massi e {r,,ic ipa t ion ln t rie la--st , elec_.ions o prr_,ident gal two
municipal), even in trie rural areas where terrorists threatened the 
voters, and the fart Chat in spite of economic turmoil, incr eased criminal 
activity and politically inspired-violence, the population rejects an 
,uth-loritari an taie over of political power. 
However, after 12 years of military rule, political institutions are weak 
and, in many cases, incipient and inoperant. The economic crisis, the 
increasing violence and greater political participation are exerting a 
sarong pressure on these institutions triai: find it very difficult to cope 
with popular demands and to adequately handle the diverse manifestations 
of an acute economic and social crisis. On the other hand, trie Jack of a 
"democratic culture" in the population, that has lived much more years 
under authoritarian rule than under a democratic system, makes it all the 
more difficult, since attitudes, rnethods of formulating clairrns and a lack 
of respect for laws and authority, many times provoke irepression and 
trigger violent reactions frorn gover-nment. 
T r ' r 
have 
r h r y r: - 1-: r r r. r. r as 1 hree rïain have heen eipj,iasized by crucial for trie 
corissolidation of t_lernocracy: respect of civil rights, improvements in the 
administration of justice, and more efficient public administration. 
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Çivilrights 
During trie successive military regimes, civilians had only lirnited 
individual rights since the routine was to suspend those costitutional 
guarantees at the government's will, Even though military dictatorships in 
Perù have been "soft" if compared with recent experiences in the southern 
corse, violations of citizens' rights were not uncommon, For instance, 
ciuring the last military government, civilians were routinely brought 
before military courts, s w,ras aileged to be an inefftctive 
remedy, and this resulted in lack of appeal of civilian courts. In 1979, the 
rew Peruvian constitution, provided for the limitation on jurisdiction of 
military courts, re-inforcement of the right of f/ab&as corpus, and the 
right to free speech. 
Ct-1r ing the f irst years of the 1 980's, trie government of Fernando Belaünde 
rn a to su sged tanr.ially irnprove the record of respect to human rights in 
Per(, How,,&v'er the escalating terrorist violence in the central Andes 
pr omot d by forced the government to suspend 
individual guarantees in trie area and to impose military control over it. 
The presence of troops in the zone rapidly deteriorated the situation of 
civil rights and claims about disappearances of peasant.s and 
Îri discr iminiate répression, involving torture and executions, became more 
frequent. The nature and tactics of the movement, which constantly 
'v'oids direct confrontation, reinforced the military conception tlrat 
repress:ion and tight controi over the population were the only 
wo ys to success. 
The situation apparently improved with the APRA government that took 
office inJuly 1987. 1n his inaugural speech to Congress, the newly elected 
President Alan Garcia emphasized the need to combat terrorism within the 
ire . t-, -7 the t of civil 1ihe fiés granted by the Const.i tution and erriocat. 
systern. Serlous investigations about humain rights violations, 
dismissal of high-rank officers molto moere found responsible and a 
i! r-iiÎicant reduction in disappearances were important achievemer'its of 
tic gG`ver r}rne(7ts' first year. The international organization America's J 
r' at tcii pC_ bl ished a report in Jonc which `.vas extremely favourabie for the 
governr7±ent. 
But things wrong. Taking advantage of the fact that the Socialist 
international Meeting was about to be inaugurated in Lima with the 
tt.endance of international personalities, Seno'ero Luirai oso prepared a 
s;yr,chroriized operation in ail the Lima jails were it had militants. Due to 
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lack of control, negiigence and an unacceptabie appr-oach to pr 
management, thé S d i'i t_ s were allowed to dug tunnels and trenches, 
bulit errrbarikrnent and set up "boobie traps" in the building where ail 
concentrated at il fronton prison, on an island off the port of Callao. 
Terrori sts also took contrai of another two prisons, including the 
reclusion centre for women. 
Having failed mediation attempts, President Garcia ordered the rrmilitary to 
take action and restore order. The resuit was a massacre in which 500 
ates t c-re kllled, includirig 330 C-/ICÎcrl 1n !(`le prison, 
i'r-iore Chan 100 prisoners were hot at pointblar range alter' 
The next day the President acknowledged Chat excesses had been 
committed during repression of the rebellion and promised to punish the 
respGï"iSible of f icers and rai-'k and file. Sel?üjel o, on its part, retal iated in 
the most irrational manner placing a bomb on a tourist train between 
Cusco and Machu Picchu, killing five foreign passengers. Also, six 
en Jt eer's workinq in development projects were murdered in Ayacucho. 
Attpli-f?ilits to cl,rify the events nd to +':;etermine have 
r _, t. ik of t` e Of s ?t_ l!`it red obstacles, i e the opposition ii o fice,, to Dubbiïlit 
t.estS.i;mi;ony. 
in civilian courts, but have also been subject. to politicai 
ÎÎi nIptu1_"{`L.ion bby .(rie lett.ist. groups t.[l[jt refuse to 'rdemn j o and 
its ruthiess C?'lethods, 
The economic crisis and the intensification of terrorism are posing a 
serious threat to civil rights and their enforcement. Edur_atior;al 
carrmpaigns to disseminate laws and procédures, the development of 
organizations that can help the pour and the illiterate to defend their 
and monitoring of the way laws are being applied, are the most 
urgent priorities in a crucial theme, which is directly iinked to the 
consolidation of an authentic democracy. 
Min inistrationofi "justice 
Improvements in the administration of justice are indispensable not only 
to defend civil rights, but also to reduce social conflict in ail spheres of 
activity. The problern with the Judiciary is that successive interruptions 
of constitutional rule have created a subservient attitude towards the 
Executive, based on a certain "fine conjuncturai sensitivity", that many 
tirries produces unacceptable sentences or makes certain ciaims totally 
!_;nnvia ble due to politicai or instance on the govern(ilent. 
Ho'vvever, stut_iies during the 1070's and 1980's show that the Judiciary 
was not only inoperant for politically sensitive cases, but aiso for 
7o j 
routinary cases involving property rights, debts, inderrinizations or 
divorce. The length and complexity of procedures ( an average case for the 
recovery of a real estate property could last between 4-5 years or more), 
deterrnined that vast sectors of the population sought alternative ways of 
reaching an agreement. For instance, big enterprises rarely took their 
significant conflicts to court, but rather preferred to submit to 
arbitration. 5pecialized instances, litre labour courts and agrarian 
trihunals to solve agrarian reforrn cases, were created to avoid the 
Judiciary's inefficiency in critical confijcti'tire areas. 
The Judiciary obviousiy suffers frorn an endemic financial problem, and its 
consequences on personnel shortages and qualif lcations, lack of 
automation to improve information flows and speed--up procedures, and 
ir!'rr--nr Put r r n h i i , n 'v'v cio_r_r ead tt co r up ion, research and technical ents 
(training and e(quipment), cari have a significant impact on its efficiency. 
Orne of the arreas currently being explored is trie application of informatics 
to the adrrrinistration of justice, adapting the e ;periences of other 
couritries. Curiously enough, during trie first phase of trie military 
governrrrent a Judiciary Reform Comission (CRJ) was created to design a 
tr ate (,r in}r t0 iÎ r v e the .atae q,al of ire r r r ipi Od ity ) a(rrr, -1rat c i. The 
cor CIlssion .3rlr?ported inter'estjr:g research and developed close links with 
non gove rrierlt.al or'(_ianizations like DESCO. Lac k. of politl( ai lpport, J 
vested interests, and the lors of influence of judges identified as 
syr{mipathetic to the military, determined that few of trie recomrnendations 
were actually implernented. 
Im rovement ofPubïic sector administration 
There have been several attempts to reorganize the Peruvian bureaucracy. 
All have failed, 
Contrary to what is normaily contended, the Peruvian public sector began 
to grow signif icantly during the f irst Belaûnde government (1963- i 968), 
and the military only continued the trend at a farter paace. The 
goverrnrnent tried to create a State appas" tuS with shore cap, city t.o 
intervene in economi'c ar(_iwth and social chaang e-, arnd therefore 
incorporated to the public sector tec.hnicians with a more 
'de'v'elopmentalist" attitude. Belaûnde also created the "Oficina National 
de Racionalizaciôn y Capacitaciôn de la Administraciôn Publica" (ONRAP) 
to tackle an(7mini5trative reform. The perception that this was a purely 
M._,: iie, the is{ nce of polit.i(_ai ions the 
and the Jack or pragmatism deterrmmined thar ONRAP's main 
product was a diagnosis of Peruvian public administration problerris in --'t0 
volumes, with no practical conséquences of any kind. 
The rnilitary governrnent also atterripted several tirnes to irnpiement 
public administration refor ms, One of these attempts resulted in the 
creation of the "Instituto Nacional de Administracldn Pûblica" (INAP). The 
INAP did not restricted itself to pure organizational reforrns but sought to 
create a bureaucracy under the conception of a "new State". At the 
beginning of the rnilitary governrnent conditions for reform seemed ideal: 
rapid and arc e expansion of State intervention in 'trie, 
r r entrepreneurial acti`vities, _ial ir.eforms, more ,-.p cific 
recto 1al d`vi lions (lever al rie ç+`i/ i 1'. r- te cre._ated ir. thé 
a ne' philosophy in which trie State was the 
engine oi accurl ul ation a. 1-1 't_lev lo r'i nt, 
Hovv'ever, INAP had a fate, similar to its predecessor ONNRAP. After initial 
enthusiasm, the reform movement languished mainly due toi absence of 
political support. The final proposai of INAP, after a strong internai 
struggle, was irrelevant if contrasted with existing problems. One of the 
main factors influencing this outcorne was, once again, the domination of 
f^ sls r, +nn r, J i i OD t i te prote _,., b yr '"experts laci,.i ng a pol i t icai perspective, INAP was crneated 
as an isolated entity and with great autonomy from thé rest of thé State 
a para.us. Ibis rv'as a{ivantageoras for experts who `r'vere érie to 
concentrate on technical issues free of pressures from the rest of the 
bureaucracy, but at the sanie time this determined Chat i NAP's lack of 
power and capacity ultirnately provoked indifference from the public 
administration, who in many instances perceived them as a nuissance. 
By 1977 tlhere were around half a million persons working in the Public 
sector, includirig the central government, public enterprises, the Judiciary, 
trie educational and health systems, etc. In 1978, the governrnent applied 
lv - ny _trng and, ofii feier:,d t ii re u-S to reduce the sr. pr e.-sure ima empt rg i ncentive .bure'auc.;ral. 
recause it needed to drastically crut the public sector déficit. According 
to recent studies, trie resuit of these policies was that the becter 
qualified left and those who had no alternative rernained. Public 
enterprises in particular, suffered the loss of valuable staff, that had been 
trained with public resources. 
When President Belat"inde took office in July 1980 he found an over-sized, 
73 1rICff11101R ôrid poorl'y1 Strt_lî prabilc cet,îr. Everl uiuuÿh public cc cor 
reforrn was not a relevant point of its prograrr;me, the Beladnde 
governrnent sought assistance from abroad, mainly from the World Bank, to 
improve the management capacity of key decision-making agencies and 
80 
ministries, as well as to rationalize the entrepreneurial activities of the 
8tate. it also emphasized the need to count on reliable data for 
der_:ision--making, in critical areas such as the national budget. However, 
the concentrated nature of the programmes and lack of political support 
1 imited the impact of the efforts to irnprove public sector administration. 
The APRA administration is aiso trying to tackie trie structure of the 
Itate apparatus, which government officiais identify as one of the biggest 
obstacles to irnplement the government programme. Although State 
ercmployees have proven to be adequate conduits for purnping income into 
the economy, they are not very efficient instruments in applying 
policies. The President hirnseif has repeatedly railed against 
the pour performance and the insensitivity to the countries plichts of trie 
1.;v l .C I lt3. 
Currently, there are about 600,000 people on the government payroll, that 
alrnost 9% of the total workforce. However, when matc'rned up 
-ag,3inst the portion classically defined as " dequately employed" the 
proportion reach es more than 20 %. If somm 300, empioyees of State 
corporations are included, then the government controls nearly hall of the 
adequately employed workforce. 
éducation accourus for atout hall of the total public administration, 
followed by interior with 1 ?%, Health with 14%, Agriculture and Transport 
k'vit.h 4% ëscb, slyd Ec înomy and Finance with 5 n. Nearly 0 4n ot ail public 
sector t r ployées, exciuding one minor welfare agency and the National 
Police Force, are concentrated in Lima. 
Concentration in the capital city, inefficiency, uncoordinated functions 
and widespread corruption seriously affect public sector performance. 
Critical agencies for public finances, like the internai revenue service, and 
for social services, like the social security system, are suif ering f rom 
these acute problems. 
This tune administrative reforrn is based on an a;rdaclous decentralisation 
i>olicy that s to give more autonomy to t he regions, thé local 
qo e i'1r e `t' aWitd to irit r _ se popular participation in the design and 
irnplementat ion of development programmes. The President has 
urider--scored the importance of this policy and bas travelled frequently to 
the provinces to hold meetings with the population and confront 
authorities with the ciaims made by their constituencies. 
``; : 1 Il n public _ _arrrlnistrat,on iss t;a_ rved at I NAP and, to a lesser extent, 
et 
at the "Escuela de Administraciôn Pt!blica" (ESAP), its training branch. Pie 
"Escuela de Negocios para Gradr_rados" and the "Universidad del 
Pacifico" (UP), also carried out research with World Bank support, but 
follow up to the initial studies through curricular changes and 
iripierirerltat on of training rie'v`er fully achieved, 
13._DECENTRAL i SA=i1 ON 
i1-1cdic_etor s rïi :rit.ioned in previous sections of this document reflect t.i+le 
centralised character of the Peruvian economy. The problem of excessive 
C:ûr`;t.( l isecl power has been under discussion since trie beginnings of the 
re i_ uhi ic and even before during Spa nish rule. Hoviever, proposais to 
he c%y .3 de isior1 nst[ances } Vr=) J en {iritÉr ed 
stror,g opposition ar;{_1 even pr-ovoked i-ri t.han 0rie ir) terna1 ari-, ed c onf1ict. 
Pressure to irriplercierit. decentralisation policies intensified since the 
_ C L, -;lith ",e upsur ge of mass politics. 11odk the 1 60's and the 
} /-S rlrr i. i; w -+rdu s Vv1;{;,-_,._se an accelerated dveloprrlee nt of popular organ1 1 in 
the rec,rons and an increasing demand for a reduction in Lima's power. The 
t.ai-y governm nt tr-ied to ir i;Jléri exit a strictiy administrative 
decer;tr ali:= ation, but its proverbial rnanipulatory approach found little 
suppi_jrt il) tiie regior,s. Besides, the transference of resources to regional 
develol ment organizations was minimal: 0.637and 1.6 % of central 
çsr)v e r l1Iien t ex ter lai ture in 1978 and 1979, respecti Il- I 
The 1979 Constitution provided the basic lecal frarnework to transfer 
decisiori rriakirlg power and financial resources to the régions, but the 
government of Fernando Belaùride advanced little in this respect. 
Departmental orgariizations that existed since the military gover lent 
were r`e-r,amed but no substantial irnprovements in theïr and 
iii nan riierit capacity took place, with very few exceptions on an ciû-/2o 
basis. 
Thé APRA t,;overr'+rilerlt diSplaye d efforts to decentalice public 
f dm i i i tr` 1t i on and a la v il) (:. r C,-g1t- ess to riefirae régions and v s of 
dec.eritr._lis.ïrig without too riuch disruption. 
Part of tïie efforts have been aimed at setting up new tiers of project 
(_.on, Tïie concept of "rnicrû regior,s" has prevailed in order to 
estep t e bilr atiC hott eneCkS and fucus attention on Critical 
poverty areas. Additionally, in July 1986, Persident Garcia announced that 
taie 1987 budget will authorize operational autonomy for the departrnental 
development agencies (called Corporaciories Departameritales cïe 
De arrollo"). The President hirnse?f is continuously pressing Congress for 
trie bill which will establish regional governments, larger administrative 
organizations which theoretically would function like federal states. 
The Peruvian bar-k.ing system, part of which is currently in trie process of 
tbeing exprrpriated, was required to set up regional branches with strict 
requirerrients for keping financial res,ources in the areas where they are 
coilected. 
Mare aguely, the President is dropping the idea of moving the capital to 
nome place in the Andes. The mort specific statements mention trie 
Central Andean region (Huancayo), following the example of Brazil and, 
re:cen 4-1 .iÿ, A geritcria. The li1P's 1ledium 'Terni Plan r ent1ons file 
ps s' itîillty of trie capital, but in its tirilet able the rriove `Would 
nct. be studied before 1988, which merns that there wouid probably be no 
action in Chat direction until after 1990. 
The issues at stake are numerous and extremely important in economic, 
political and social terras, If the experirrment is successful, ed-ucation, 
bealth, development of infrastructure, and popular participation can 
benefit. However, many questions as to whether existing facilities and 
i 1 E able i .rl an i esoürces `1sjo.«i+d he to wiii.h the demands of popuia-ation 
and assume the functions delegated by government. 
Public supported research is aiso part of trie decentralisation process. For 
ïn;stance INIAA is current.ly tr }nsferring resporisibllities to regito(-,al 
Cric=ies ai--d research centres. Pilot exper`ience'v have started wit.h the 
mininq and trie agricuitural sector, Puno has been chosen as the f irst 
region to be created for decentralisation purposes. One of the issues 
currently emerging is the role that local and Lima-based non governmental 
uïrg_ nizat.1ons con play in sr_ipporting local governments and public 
development agencies. 
